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resumo 
 
 
O presente texto propõe uma solução para a gestão de identidade digital 
online tendo em conta a versatilidade, o anonimato, a privacidade, a 
veracidade, a credibilidade e a responsabilidade do utilizador, recorrendo para 
isso ao uso do Cartão de Cidadão Electrónico Nacional Português e a outros 
meios de autenticação públicos usados diariamente pelos utilizadores. A 
dissertação é composta pela apresentação do conceito de identidade e das 
suas particularidades, por uma análise aos vários problemas da gestão da 
informação pessoal online, uma análise aos vários modelos, mecanismos e 
especificações existentes para gerir a identidade digital online (gestão de 
identidade digital). Uma solução de gestão de identidade digital baseada no 
modelo de identidade federada e associada ao Cartão do Cidadão Electrónico 
Nacional Português é apresentada, descrita, analisada, avaliada e comparada 
com outras soluções existentes. 
Por fim um protótipo de um provedor de identidades digitais federadas 
baseado na solução de gestão de identidade digital proposta é apresentado. 
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abstract 
 
The following text provides a solution for the digital identity management on the 
Web regarding the users’ versatility, anonymity, privacy, veracity, 
trustworthiness and accountability by using the Portuguese National Electronic 
Citizen Identity Card and other publicly available authentication mechanisms 
users use daily. The dissertation consists of the presentation of the concept of 
identity and its particularities, an analysis to the several problems of managing 
personal information online, and an analysis to the several existing models, 
mechanisms and specifications for the management of the digital identity online 
(digital identity management). A solution for digital identity management based 
on the federated identity model and associated to the Portuguese National 
Electronic Citizen Identity Card is introduced, described, analyzed, evaluated 
and compared to other several existing solutions. Last, a prototype of a 
federated digital identity provider based on the purposed solution for digital 
identity management is presented. 
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1 Introduction 
Nowadays people use internet every day, to read news, watch videos, talk to friends, 
upload photos to a share-gallery, update twitter status, etc. Personal information sharing is 
one of the most common online activities that everyone does very often, either with web 
applications or other users. Many times users feel forced to give up about some privacy in 
order to share a piece of their personal information with others. Very often they tend to 
reproduce the provisioning of their personal information or the information of others across 
many online platforms giving up about either the secure storage concerns on the 
information shared or in its unauthorized disclosure.  
1.1 Motivation 
The Web offers a myriad of services to registered users. Registering on those services 
requires filling a registration form, choosing a username or providing an email address and 
some personal data, such as name, age, or any other relevant personal information. In the 
end of the registration process a digital identity is created in the system. When a user 
registers in several websites, he/she has several digital identities (assessment credentials) to 
manage. With the boost of Web 2.0 and electronic business, web applications started to 
request increasingly more personal information to allow users to use the services they 
provide, either to create a social network or to buy products in any e-business. This growth 
of personal information exchanging between users and services forced users to have their 
personal information scattered across many systems online. Hence, a better management of 
the users‘ information and far more secure and reliable channels of communications are 
required [1]. The traditional exchanging means that users have been using to share their 
personal information lacks the mechanisms to provide full control over the disclosure and 
dissemination of the personal information they share as well as its scrutiny and 
displacement monitoring. The security of the exchanging means and the protection of the 
information integrity being exchanged are not assured either. Most of the times encrypted 
communications channels are not used for the transmission of the information e.g., the use 
of TLS. The protection of the integrity of the information being exchanged in non-
encrypted channels as well as its non-unauthorized disclosure is, thus, not undertaken at 
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all. Neither the users‘ privacy-safety nor their anonymity when exchanging their personal 
information is guaranteed.  Moreover, most often there are not reliable mechanisms to 
certify that the information users provide to represent them is either accurate or asserted as 
either true or false. Therefore, more secure and efficient authentication mechanisms are 
mandatory in order to project the next generation of digital identity management [2-3]. 
This masters‘ dissertation reflects on the certification, integrity assurance and privacy-
safety of the users‘ personal information, and its scattering across Web applications as well 
as in the users‘ anonymity protection by taking an approach to federated identity 
management concept. Consequently, it also reflects on the users‘ accountability online.  
1.2 Objectives 
This Master‘s thesis will study and analyze the digital identity management discipline 
in order to gather the most valuable features and specifications for developing an identity 
framework. A federated identity initiative will be used as well as several strong 
identification mechanisms publicly available, such as the Portuguese National Electronic 
Citizen Identity Card [4]. The proposed framework will be named GlobaliD. The identity 
framework goal is to offer an improved model for online digital identity management and 
to test whether the current digital identity management can be enhanced in order to give 
users better experience while managing and sharing their personal information and 
accessing the myriad of services offered online. The ultimate aim is to take a step further in 
the digital identity management and therefore in the privacy and anonymity safety of the 
online users by making it more versatile, responsible, reliable, authentic, accountable, 
trustworthy, integral and privacy safe, anonym and thus more secure.  An identity provider 
prototype based on the GlobaliD framework will be presented in order to illustrate the 
framework aims and achievements. 
1.3 Methodology  
To achieve the thesis‘ objectives, the work will be divided into three main parts: 
Identity, Digital Identity Management and a proposal of a Digital Identity Management 
framework. The Identity concept was deeply implicated in this work thus I realized that 
firstly I would have to approach its notion in order to have a rich background about the 
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subject such as: gathering the main identity characteristics, requirements and concerns, 
before proceed to the study of the identity management discipline itself, the subject that 
follows. After the identity subject was studied the management of identity would be better 
understood and worked out. On the approach to digital identity management discipline it 
will firstly be taken under consideration the problems of digital identity, and its 
particularities. Then the technologies and the models involved on the managing of digital 
identities. The study of the state of the art on digital identity management is introduced 
afterwards. The several initiatives for managing the users‘ digital identities were analyzed 
and explained. With the digital identity management discipline understood and the main 
existing initiatives addressing this subject known, a proposal for a digital identity 
management framework arose and an identity provider prototype to evaluate the proposed 
identity framework aims was developed. Finally conclusions on this work and projections 
about future developments of the identity framework proposed were outlined. 
1.4 Document Structure 
Federated identity management is a model of the digital identity management 
discipline. For a better understanding of the concept of digital identity management it is 
important that the notion of identity is well understood and comprehended in its plenitude 
in the first place. Therefore, the following section approaches the notion of identity in 
several different scenarios and perspectives and deeply analyzes its particularities as well 
as indicates the several definitions implied. On section 3 it will be introduced the digital 
identity management discipline. The concepts and the actors involved will be indicated and 
described. Several problems that the digital identities face in the identity management 
systems will be discussed. It will be approached the authentication procedure and its 
several parts. Technologies involved in digital identity management will be mentioned and 
explained, as well. Section 4 introduces two models for digital identity management. The 
benefits and pitfalls of each model will be analyzed. It will be also presented several 
techniques for managing the users‘ credentials information online. Sections 5 and 6 are 
dedicated to the federated identity matter. On section 5 it will be presented a series of 
requirements involved in the implementation of federated identity scenarios. The specifics 
of federated identity will be described. Section 6 is dedicated to a number of federated 
identity initiatives. Every initiative‘s specification will be introduced and described. 
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Section 7 presents the essentials of the SAML 2.0 according to its use in the development 
of the previously referred identity provider framework GlobaliD. This framework for 
implementing digital identity management will be introduced, described and analyzed in 
the section 8. On the section 9 it will be presented the characteristics of the identity 
provider prototype developed. Finally, on the section 10 it will be discussed the work made 
and projections about a future work on the GlobaliD framework will be presented. 
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2  Identity 
We use our identity each day of our lives. It says about our essence, about what we are 
and reveals our behavioral nature. Our identity is expressed within a particular 
environment, based on the perception we want to address to the people we interact with 
and on our desired goals. Therefore the way our identity is transmitted is of our concern 
because it establishes the proper setting, appearance and manner in the interaction with 
other identities as it also shapes our image to others as well. A collection of impressions is 
what express our identity. They shape our performance on self-presentation and 
understanding of the self to others. The impressions of an identity are actions or signs 
made by us, provoking sensations on others in order to create certain reaction on them. It 
gives us an outwards appearance that can be used to convince other identities in our favor. 
Most of the times, whether or not we are aware of the impressions we transmit, a persona 
is imputed to us by others. This happens regardless of our state of mind, our lack of faith or 
even ignorance of our performance. Impressions are hence, the elements used to express 
our identity, revealing themselves as a key factor to the identity presentation, expression 
and interaction. Therefore it is important we can control the impressions we transmit about 
ourselves and the way they are transmitted to whomever, whenever and whatever our 
reasons are [5].  
The way impressions are transmitted and controlled falls into the impression 
management field [6]. Impression management refers to the process through which people 
try to control the perceptions that other people form of them. In the virtual world, the 
Internet, we usually interact with people as we do in the real world. Even though it happens 
through the Internet communications framework and not in our real environment, the way 
we express ourselves is still by transmitting impressions. They are still telling how we are, 
or even better, how we want others to think we are. Therefore, we can say the difference 
between physical and digital social settings is intimately connected with the different 
strategies for representation of self and the kinds of social discernment they afford. In a 
computer-mediated world the expression of identity occurs primarily not through direct 
experience of the body but within the constraints of digital representation constructed by 
interactive systems. Hence, in this environment people have to create new ways for 
representing themselves and new ways of reading the signals communicated by others in 
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order to compensate the loss of physical presence. It is important that the impressions of 
our Identity are according with our goals in order not to be misunderstood because they are 
what tell whether a social engagement with us is appropriated or not. If it is, they also tell 
how this engagement is better to be accomplished. Thus, it is important that the 
impressions about our identity are transmitted clearly, leaving no margin to avoidable 
misunderstandings [7]. 
The Internet is an infrastructure of both hardware and software that provides 
connectivity to computers. It‘s the base of the Web, a collection of inter-connected 
documents, named websites, linked under the rules of the HTTP protocol, used by millions 
of people nowadays. The Web made possible for humans of any part of the world to 
communicate among each other more easily and cheaply, than never before, without being 
restricted by their current location. Everyday individuals use the Internet or the Web for 
communicating with other individuals, either because social or professional reasons, by 
posting some sort of media type on their blog or social network or even by either video or 
text chatting. Thus, the Web became a very used mean by which users transmit their 
impressions to others and express their identity. This was possible due to a evolution from 
a simple and static distributed hypertext service of pages for publication of contents [8] to 
a complex and dynamic system of hypermedia applications [9], more user centered and 
adapted to the different requirements of its users and participants. The advent of Web 2.0 
demanded that new rules and mechanisms should be created to manage the different parts 
and services of the Web. Different users have different needs and objectives. The same can 
be said about Web application. Therewithal other features had to be added with the user 
customization in mind. In order to achieve the customization of the various web services 
working online according to the users‘ demands and preferences, the concept of digital 
identity was introduced to represent the user in a computer-mediated environment.  
To better understand the concept of digital identity, firstly the concept of identity must 
be understood due to its ambiguity. Identity is a deep and wide concept, with plenty of 
particularities, which are confusing and may even be contradictory, that when not very 
well understood, identity may seem ambiguous. The following subsections will provide an 
overview of the different parts of Identity (where digital identity is one of them) for an 
easy and clear elucidation. Further it will be introduced some key aspects that should be 
considered when projecting the next generation of digital identity and the technologies 
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made to certify an Identity. Last, as an introduction to the next section digital identity 
management, the laws of the digital identity by Kim Cameron will be presented for 
providing a baseline of the digital identity management requirements. 
2.1 Definitions 
Identity is a deep and wide concept, outlined by a plurality of particularities. Therefore 
a myriad of definitions exist to specify each particularity that makes Identity a unit. The 
next subsection addresses several of definitions presented in [10-11]. 
Subject – within the identity context a subject may be a person, an organization, a 
company, a club, a corporation, software or other identity (I use more entity than subject 
regarding this master‘s thesis). 
Attribute – self inherent feature of an identity. An attribute of an Identity is an element 
that characterizes the Identity. It can be an extrinsic or intrinsic characteristic of the 
Identity. Medical history, past purchasing behavior, bank balance, credit rating, age, 
weight, and height are a few examples of any Individual‘s Identity characteristics.  
Identifier – any attribute that solely represents the identity. The identifier of an identity 
distinguishes it within the context of a specific namespace. An identifier can be also 
referred to as name, labeler or designator.  
Persistent Identifier – a persistent identifier associated with a characteristic of a subject 
that is difficult or impossible to change. Date of birth and genetic code are two examples of 
persistent identifiers related to a human being. In such case, the persistent identifier may be 
called as personal identifier, as well. 
Transient Identifier – or one-time Identifier, is a type of opaque identifier that is only 
valid during a specific session. This allows the user not to be recognized at multiple 
uncorrelated visits to the same service provider. Since the used identifiers are different at 
each user visit, this identifier cannot be used by the service provider to correlate the user 
visits or to discern anyone of them. 
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Preference – is a demonstration of distinction about a particular element by the Identity. A 
preference of an identity can be the preferred seating on an airplane, currency used, 
favorite brand of shoes, and the use of one encryption standard over another, and so on. 
Trait – is a self-inherent attribute that outlines the individual, such as blue eyes (being), 
how and where a company is incorporated (location), color of the skin, and so on. 
Claim – is an allegation a subject does about a self-attribute that is in doubt or being in 
dispute. 
Identification – is an association of a particular identifier with an individual presenting 
certain attributes. It may be called clamming proofing, as well. 
2.2 Particularities of the Identity  
Identity may be seen by different perspectives, either philosophical or mathematical. A 
bad understanding of the identity definition may, in certain scenarios, blur the 
identification of different identities. Next, some of the perspectives to which Identity may 
be projected will be introduced and described, some scenarios will be presented and 
problems that may blur the identification of different identities will be pointed out. 
2.2.1 Identity 
The meaning of Identity seems to be pretty clear to everyone but unfortunately it is not 
always the case. Any dictionary states that the meaning of the word Identity is: the 
Circumstance of an individual being the one that he/she says he/she is or the one that 
another identity assumes he/she is. If we pick the word ‖circumstance‖ from the meaning 
of Identity we realized that circumstance is all that surrounds an element, all that makes 
part of it and belongs to it, all that somehow is connected and related to it and makes it an 
unique entity. Identity can be therefore briefly defined by the set of permanent or long-
lived temporal attributes associated with an entity. Identity is usually what represents an 
entity within a specific context. The entities attributes are what identifies the entities, 
describes its characteristics and differentiates them from other identities. If any of the 
attributes of an identity is unique, it can be seen as an identifier, and therefore may be used 
to refer to the identity. It is important to deeply understand the Identity concept because it 
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is what represents us as an entity. Identity is therefore important. It is related to the 
existence of objects, their uniqueness and distinctness from other objects. It is the relation 
that states the sameness or identicalness of an object and it is the fundament for reasoning 
and understanding. Identity is the fundament for the human being comprehension of nature 
and interaction among themselves. Identity is what allows individuals to position 
themselves and to define the relations with other objects in the environment they are within 
[12].  
Identity may be differentiated in quality identity and quantity identity. Qualitative 
identity highlights the properties of the object, so objects can be more or less qualitatively 
identical. Numerical identity requires the absolute qualitative identity [13]. Although a 
Ferrari and a Lamborghini are qualitatively identical because both share the property of 
being a car, two Ferraris can be more identical because both share the fact of being of a 
Ferrari brand. 
 “x and y are to be properly counted as one just in case they are numerically 
identical” (Geach 1973). 
2.2.2 Logical Identity 
Identity is usually intuitive as it begins when one recognizes other. Identity was first 
formalized by:  
 Aristotle‘s Law of Identity: A is A for any A. Everything is itself. 
Along with two others laws it constitutes the foundation of formal logic. 
 The Law of contradiction: Not (A and Not A). Nothing can both be and not to 
be. 
 The law of Excluded Middle: A or Not A. Everything must be or not to be 
The combination of this three deduces that:  
 A is Not A - for any A. 
Discrete Mathematics defines Identity as a relation of equivalency, i.e., for two 
elements to be identical they must be equivalent [14]. Equivalency is a relation of 
reflectivity, symmetry and transitivity: 
 Reflectivity - for every A, A  A 
 Symmetry  - for every A and B,  if  and only if A  B then B  A 
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 Transitivity - for every A, B and C, if A B and B  C then A  C. 
Although the laws and definition mentioned before are quite intuitive and useful for 
recognizing identities, they are not rigorous enough for systematic recognition. Therefore 
more formal laws are required. The Leibniz‘s law, a.k.a., Identity of Indiscernibles states 
that: 
 No two distinct substances exactly resemble each other. 
This can be understood as: 
 No two objects have exactly the same properties. 
The Identity of the Indiscernibles is outlined by two principles: the indiscernibility of 
Identicals  and the Identicals of Indiscernibles [12-13]. 
Principle 1: The indiscernibility of identical 
For any x and y, if x is identical to y, then x and y have all the same properties: 
 
For any x and y, if x and y differ with respect to some property, then x is non-identical 
to y. 
 
The indiscernibility of identicals states that if two objects are numerically identical (the 
same one), they must have the same properties, i.e. qualitatively identical. Numerical 
identity must imply qualitative identity.  
Principle 2: The Identity of Indiscernibles 
For any x and y, if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y. 
 
For any x and y, if x is non-identical to y, then x and y differ with respect to some 
property. 
 
The identity of indiscernibles says that if two objects have all the same properties, i.e. 
qualitatively identical, they are numerically identical. Qualitative identity implies 
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numerical identity. Therefore, from the combination of the two principles it may be 
realized that numerical identity is equivalent to qualitative identity.  
Although the Law of Identity seems to be simple and reasonable, it is philosophical 
controversial due to its paradoxes. I will refer just The Paradox of Time and Change, The 
Infinity Problem, The Ship of Theseus Paradox. It is important to take a look to these 
paradoxes because they give us a better understanding of identities and how to distinguish 
them. 
The Paradox of Time and Change takes the human oldness to state that the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals cannot be used to determine whether it is the same object in 
time and space. Despite the fact that a human being gets old, we cannot say that he/she is a 
different person in different times of his life. 
For The Infinity Problem paradox, objects consist of an infinite number of properties 
which may have infinitely many values and hence are indeterminate. Therefore, the 
Identity of Indiscernibles is not usable because it is not possible to determine the 
identicalness of all the properties of two objects in order to determine their identicalness. 
The Ship of Theseus Paradox is, in a way, related to the Paradox of Time and Change. 
It puts down the Indiscernibility of Identicals because the fact a human being had a heart 
valve replacement does not make him a different person.  
There are other paradoxes worth to take a look as The Symmetric Universe, The 
Impact of Quantum Mechanics and The Paradox of Constitution. However, they will not 
be discussed here because it would be deepen to much the Identity matter for this thesis. 
For deeper insights on the Identity matter please refer to [12-13].  
From the study of the Identity in Logic we can hypothesize that the better way of 
distinguishing identities or to check if they are equal, is not by verifying if they share the 
same properties or by admitting that they are equal, but rather to assure that they share the 
same properties except for their identifiers. Identifiers are what differentiate identities, so 
for two identities to be unlinkable in any context they must not share common identifiers. 
2.2.3 Personal Identity 
The identity of things is a controversial subject, as it could be seen on the previous 
subsection. However, personal identity is even more controversial and complex. Personal 
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Identity is about a person ascertaining the sameness of another person. It is about to be 
capable to discern one person from the other. There are several questions about the concept 
of personal identity and of course a variety of opinions asserting about it [12].  
One of the opinions asserting about the personal identity of a person is related to the 
persistence of the person characteristics over time. It focuses on finding the requirements 
necessary to conclude that one person at one time is identical to another one at a different 
time. Due to the constantly changes of a human being though its life time it is not possible 
to determine how many differences are tolerable for stating whether it is still being the 
same person and not a different one in different periods of time. Therefore the qualitative 
identity cannot be used to determine the sameness of a person. 
Another opinion states that the personal Identity is also strongly related to the 
psychological part of the human being. This psychological approach asserts that a certain 
psychological continuity is necessary for a person to persist. The human being inherits the 
mental features like beliefs, memories, preferences and capability for rational so, the 
present being mental futures are inherited from the past being. This approach meets a 
serious paradox. If it was possible to transplant the person‘s brain to one empty head it 
could not be longer said that the person remained the same after this change. A somatic 
approach to the identity term defines that identity is strongly comprised of some brute 
physical relation, the past or future of the being is related to the presence of the same body 
or biological organism through time. Both previously opinions assert that there is 
something that it takes for a person to persist. A more simplistic view of Identity states that 
a person existing at one time is identical with a human being existing at another if and only 
if they are identical. An opinion based on the evidences of the being states that the person 
here now is the one for some time before given the persistence requirements [12]. 
The different opinions asserting about the Identity term indicates that it is not yet fully 
understood and that human beings are still struggling to define it. No matter which 
definitions the human kind will reach for defining identity in the days to come, if an 
individual has a plurality of identities there must be a way that through one identity it is 
possible to reach the individual to which the identity belongs to. 
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2.2.4 Citizen Identity 
To define citizen identity we have to do it within a nationality or government 
administration because citizen identity is citizenship. Citizenship is an attribute asserted by 
government according to its ruling. This part of identity is strongly physically oriented 
rather than psychologically, focusing more on the physical continuity of the person. 
Therefore, it is more adequate to use only a set of properties that are intrinsic to the 
physical body of the person and others extrinsic to it as family name, first name and 
address. These characteristics are called attributes and some of it can be also identifiers. 
Both can be temporary or persistent. 
2.2.5 Real Identity 
The real identity is used by us every day in the real world. It is the means by which 
people interact with the world and transmit their demands, wishes and transmit their 
intentions and emotions. The real identity is strongly attached to the physical presence of 
the identity, its extrinsic and intrinsic characteristics. It is also connected to citizen identity, 
as well as to the personal identity. The real identity is inserted within the context of the 
physical environment of the subject and is strongly affected by the physical presence of the 
body [7]. 
2.2.6 Digital Identity 
Digital Identity can be defined as the digital representation of the overall known 
information about a subject across network systems. The subject can be a person, a group, 
a corporation, an organization, software, a machine, or any other identifiable entity. The 
digital representation of the identity is a digital collection of data representing the 
attributes, preferences, traits and claims of an identity. The information can be of any kind 
since it is related to and about the individual. The overall information can be a username 
and passwords, name, address, contacts, like email, phone numbers, mobile numbers, work 
address, IP address, bank account, written opinions, etc. Also make part of the digital 
identity the online identity defined next [10]. 
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2.2.7 Online Identity 
Online identity is part of the digital identity. It is a social identity that users establish in 
online communities. Online identity is outlined by the overall accounts users have in the 
various systems across the internet, such as the facebook social network, twitter, and 
youtube [10]. 
2.3 Representation of Digital Identity 
A digitally mediated world requires that we express our identity through mediating 
layers of software design in order to reach our audience. There are thus two different parts 
of communications at stake: how humans represent themselves and how humans read the 
representation of others online. Within the constraints of computer-mediated 
communications, humans represent themselves through text or visual descriptions due to 
the lack of the physical presence of the body. Graphic avatars are often used within online 
games and forums to act out the intentions of their creators and express their identity 
online, even though most of the times they say nothing about the real body of the user.  
Music personality (sharing of music playlists) was also corroborated to constitute a tool of 
identity expression [15] and from it we may project a part of the identity of the person (its 
likes and dislikes) and we may even be capable to project a physical outlook in some cases. 
There are other kinds of identifiers that may tell a lot about the identity of a user, such as 
email addresses or mobile phone numbers. These are the most wide spread substitutes for 
the body. They are the virtual destination of the messages sent to a person and the source 
of the personal identity expression. Through them we may construct narratives about the 
owners. The domain of the email address may tell about the owner‘s features. For example, 
one of my emails is frank@ua.pt, the ‗ua‘ domain, in this particular case, says that I am a 
current or former worker or student at the University of Aveiro, in Portugal. It may be 
checked just by reaching the domain www.ua.pt. The location of the university, the city as 
well as the country where it is located, dictates a higher probability of me being a 
Portuguese citizen than a Venezuelan one, even though both may be true. In the case of a 
phone country code, it may indicate a cultural context even if the owner does not live in 
such country.  Digital representation may be even expressed to others unconsciously. A 
default name for the home wireless network may say the owner does not care about the 
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security of his/her wireless network or he/she does not have the enough knowledge to 
configure it. Even though some of the identifiers mentioned here may represent the body, 
they cannot replace it. One attempt to ensure trust and consistency of the presence of the 
body is to introduce biometrics – to literally translate bodily identity into digital terms. In 
most cases, it is not a literal representation of the body that is being expressed, but a 
different representative form that substitutes it. Therefore, throughout the examples 
described, it can be said that the physical presence of the body cannot be replaced, just 
represented [7]. 
2.4 Digital and Real Identities Compared 
From both digital and online identity we can realize that online identity is more about 
the social component of the digital Identity. It is about all the socials relationships across 
the Internet. In the case of the digital identity term, it is a more general concept. The digital 
identity encloses all the forms of information about an entity across online services 
providers which include the online identity, and tells about the owner‘s identity. 
The real identity of a subject regards not only to the extrinsic attributes of the subject 
but also to the intrinsic ones. In the real identity, the physical part of the subject is strongly 
present and it is the means by which everyone contacts with physical world. The physical 
presence of the body is one of the most influential instruments of the real identity. 
2.5 Next Generation of Digital Identity  
In order to be possible to talk about the next generation of digital identity, a perception 
of how people see their identity in the real world must be taken because identity is 
something personal that may have ramifications on people‘s private life. What is 
acceptable to do and what is not must be known for projecting the next generation of 
digital identity in order not to go against the peoples‘ privacy requirements. According to 
the citizens‘ cultural context and its generations, some demands are more acceptable than 
others in what relates to people‘s identity intrusion. The people of North America have 
troubles accepting any identity document while they think that it is perfectly acceptable to 
have video cameras in every street corner or to apply DNA test to immigrants. In France 
DNA tests are unacceptable and were refused by the Chamber of Senators, video cameras 
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are never welcome, but most people think it is normal for the police to ask for an ID Card 
whenever they want. Working in the identity field demands a study of the people‘s culture 
and history to verify what is and what is not acceptable to do in which is related to their 
identity [2].  
One of the things people love the most is their privacy. Therefore this aspect must be 
taken into consideration when projecting the next generation of identity. In order to 
achieve total privacy, the users must have full control over the disclosure and 
dissemination of his/her digital identity and its information. Moreover privacy demands 
anonymity. Therewithal to fulfill these requirements mechanisms must be implemented to 
enable users to control the provisioning of their digital identity information to others. Also, 
the identity management systems responsible for the management of the digital identities 
must have means to avoid the linking between the digital identities and their holders. 
Trustworthiness is another requirement of the digital identity next generation. The 
information of the digital identity or a part of it must be true in order to make both the 
digital identity and the digital identity management reliable and responsible. No true 
information in a digital identity means no real identity behind it. Thereupon, several means 
have to be adopted in order to certify that at least some of the information about the user of 
the digital identity is true. The means by which these demands will be achieved have to be 
carefully analyzed because, according to the cultural context, a lot of people tend to 
suspect about technology applied to their identity [2]. The devices and mechanism adopted 
have to be trustworthy and flawless. That is why e-governance initiatives have a lot to 
contribute to the next generation of digital identity and to the identity management world 
by providing digital identities to internet users as they do for their citizens. E-governance 
may either be the step to make identity management transparent and it may also help on 
freeing governments from corruption [16]. E-governance could be the step to improve 
digital identity management on the Web, as well [17].  As can be realized, the technology 
needed to fulfill these demands is complex (and complexity must be avoidable), mostly for 
users rather than for the systems, because users are the main key to its propagation and 
diffusion. Users are the ones that say whether it is acceptable or not the use of some kind 
of technology in their daily life. For the mentioned responses, the next generation of digital 
identity must considerably care about each particularity of people‘s identity when 
projecting any new digital identity solution. 
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2.6 Personal Digital Certificate 
Digital certificates are part of a developing set of technologies that can address many 
of today‘s security, identity and accessibility issues. They are part of a technology called 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Digital certificates are made by a cryptographic key pair 
and information about a user, as well as a certain collection of attributes of the subject. 
Therefore, digital certificates have been described as virtual ID cards.  Each certificate is 
digitally signed by the issuer authority. The cryptographic keys asserted to the certificate 
may be used to sign, encrypt and decrypt documents. Consequently, it may be used for 
authentication purposes, as well. The public key, as it says, is available to others. It checks 
the signature and encrypts documents. Otherwise, the private key is kept secretly to the 
holder possession, and it is used either to sign or decrypt documents. Digital certificates are 
asserted or created by Certificate Authorities (CAs). These authorities are responsible for 
issuing, managing and revoking digital certificates. An example of a CA includes 
VeriSign, a well-known commercial provider[18].  
The following table provides an illustration of a certificate composition. 
Table 1 - Certificate structure. 
Certificate version n.º 
 
 
Certificate 
contents 
Private information 
Private information encapsulated 
x. 509 certificate 
Certificate cancelation list 
Others 
Certificate sub contents 
Certificate content and encryption key 
Certificate finger mark 
 
Certificates may be of many types. The most relevant are: 
 Root or authority certificates – are certificates that create the base or the root of 
a certification authority hierarchy. These certificates are not signed by another 
CA – they are self-signed by the CA that created them. When a certificate is 
self-signed, it means that the name in the issuer field is the same as the name in 
the subject field. 
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 Browser Certificates - used for securing and authenticating the communications 
between web browsers and web servers. This type of certificate is the most 
popular. 
 Client Certificates - this type of certificates are also known as end-entity 
certificates, identity certificates, or personal certificates.  They are certificates 
that an entity holds for proving its identity when accessing a certificate enabled 
web service. The use of certificates in theses situation are correlated to mutual 
authentication of the service‘s session participants. In order to prove the 
identity by using the certificate, it must belong to the chain of certification in 
the first place. 
The parties involved in a certificate cycle are: 
 The issuing party – the party that digitally signs the certificate after creating the 
information in the certificate or checking its accuracy. 
 The requesting party – the party who needs the certificate, and will use the 
information of it for identification or access purposes. 
 The verifying party – validates the signature on the certificate and then relies 
on its contents for some purpose. It is the one that is going to consume the 
certificate. 
Digital certificates together with smart cards have proven a relevant value for identity 
confirmation and business negotiations legal binding [19].  
2.7 Smart Cards 
Smart cards are portable tamper-resistant cryptographic devices that play a key role in 
digital identity by securely strong the card owner identity attributes and preserving its 
privacy, and by providing strong authentication of the card owner before releasing identity 
attributes [20]. A huge number of smart cards are deployed by mobile network operators to 
authenticate and identify subscribers to the GSM and 3G networks, and by banks and 
financial institutions for payment. Large deployments are also on the way for government 
identification cards or electronic passports. The security of the smart cards against physical 
and logical attacks has been achieved thru the development of advanced counter-measures 
and as a result, smart cards are the de-facto standard for digital security.  Smart cards are 
able to hold certificates, becoming a mean for strong authentication, which can provide a 
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two-factor authentication, i.e. something I have (the smart-card) and something I know (the 
pin of the smart card). The smart cards are being implemented with PKI features as means 
of citizen identification, authentication and signature, and for the access of a wide range of 
online state services. Several European countries have implemented smartcards and 
certificates for their official citizenship identification documents. There is even a European 
project to establish a European eID interoperability that allows citizens to establish new e-
relations across borders, just by presenting their national eID (see www.eid-stork.eu). 
2.8 Identity proof 
The proof of identity is done by claiming to have some attributes. Usually, identity 
proof is done by presenting a document provided by an entity, in the case of citizenship, 
the citizen cards are the elements asserted for that purpose. 
2.9 The Portuguese Citizen Card 
The Portuguese Citizen Card is a convergence of technologies and government 
capabilities. It is inserted within a European e-government initiative. The Portuguese 
Citizen Card is the official document given to the Portuguese Citizens to enable them to 
securely identify themselves to others by validating their claims with a reliable document 
given by a civil registration institution under the administration of the government of the 
Portuguese Republic. As a technological document it allows its‘ holders to identify 
themselves when dealing with computerized services and to authenticate electronic 
documents.  
 
Figure 1 - Illustration of the Portuguese Citizen Card. 
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The Citizen Card has printed in both sides intrinsic information about its holder. The 
information that can be seen in both sides of the card is:  
 A picture of the users face. 
 Name, family name and the name of the parents. 
 Nationality. 
 Civil ID number, taxes number, social security number and health number.  
 Gender, height, date of birth. 
 Date of expire, holder‘ signature. 
The Portuguese Citizen Card has an embedded smart card to enable Portuguese 
Citizens to identify themselves when interacting with the State‘s electronic systems. This 
smart card holds the information printed in the card, a digital certificate for electronic 
authentication and signature purposes, digital finger print information and other more 
information as the holder‘s current address [4].  
2.10 Laws of the Digital Identity 
The Laws of Identity referred here are the ones made by Kim Cameron, Architect 
identity at Microsoft and author of the blog www.identityblog.com. These laws explain the 
successes and failures of digital identity systems [21]:  
1. User control and Consent:  
a. Any personal information should not be revealed without the user‘s consent.  
b. The user is in control of what information is released and what digital identities 
are used. 
c. The systems should warn the user about the consumers systems of his/her 
identity and that it goes to the right place. 
d. The user should be aware of the purposes of collecting their personal 
information. 
2. Minimal disclosure for a constrained use: 
a. Systems should implement principles of limited information to avoid risks. 
b. Minimize aggregation of identity information to minimize the risk. 
c. Systems shouldn‘t use unique identifiers. 
3. Justifiable Parties:  
 GLOBALiD FEDERATED DIGITAL IDENTITY 
 
21 
 
a. The user should be aware of the parties or parties with whom he/she is 
interacting while sharing information. 
b. The disclosure of identity information is limited to parties having a necessary 
and justifiable place in giving identity relationship. 
c. Every party to disclosure must provide the disclosing party with a policy 
statement about information use. 
4. Directed Identity: 
a. A universal identity system must support both ―omni-directional‖ identifiers 
for use by public entities and ―unidirectional‖ identifiers for use by private 
entities, thus facilitating discovery while preventing unnecessary release of 
correlation handles. 
5. Pluralist of Operators and Technologies: 
a. A universal identity system must channel and enable the inter-working of 
multiple identity technologies run by multiples identity providers. 
b. A universal system must embrace differentiation of contexts (roles). 
6. Human integration: 
a. The universal identity systems must define the human user to be a component 
of the distributed system integrated through unambiguous human-machine 
communication mechanisms offering protection against identity attacks. 
7. Consistent Experience across contexts: 
a. The unifying identity metasystem must guarantee its users a simple, consistent 
experience while enabling separation of contexts through multiple operators 
and technologies. 
Even though these laws were made specifically for the Microsoft metasystem, they 
should be taken in account when projecting any digital identity management system. 
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3 Digital Identity Management 
The definition of Digital Identity Management differs according to the context in 
which it is seen. For the purpose of this master thesis Digital Identity Management is 
defined as a discipline that consists of processes, policies and technologies to manage the 
complete lifecycle of the user identities, the disclosure and dissemination of its information 
across the services online as well as to control the user access to the systems resources 
(services providers) by associating user rights and restrictions. These resources include 
information services process capability, buildings and physical assets. Identity 
management can be also referred as Identity and Access Management [22]. 
Throughout this section it will be mentioned, described, and explained the digital 
identity management discipline. Firstly, it will be introduced a variety of definitions 
involved in the digital identity management field, and then it will be approached the 
problems of digital identity. The authentication subsection will described the main 
authentication methods. Further a key element of digital identity management, the Public 
Key Infrastructure and the application protocols for the transportation of identity 
information: the HTTP and TLS will be introduced and described.  Last, it will be made 
the section analyses in the discussion subsection. 
3.1 Concepts 
In order to understand better the Digital Identity Management matter and its models a 
few concepts must be firstly introduced [23-25]. The definitions of the section 2.1 must be 
considered   
User – the term ‗user‘ refers to the physical person who is interaction with the computer 
system. The user is a virtual entity for a computer system that is represented by a persona 
(or a collection of personae). 
Persona – the term ‗persona‘ is used for the digital representation of user‘s characteristics. 
The user may maintain several personae that may be more or less related to each other. The 
characteristics of a persona are represented in the form of attributes. Thereby the personae 
are part of the digital identity of the user. 
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Account – an Account is a data structure that is usually kept in the computer system 
databases. The account is used for access control purposes, storing attributes, credentials, 
etc. Account is usually used as a persistent storage for (partial) persona attributes, but it 
also may be unrelated to any physical user persona. 
Entitlements – are the name for the services and resources to which an identity is entitled: 
credit limits, disk space, bandwidth allocations. 
Permissions – are the actions that the subject is allowed to perform with respect to the 
resource: withdrawing funds, completing a purchase, updating a record, and so on. 
Permissions are related to access control ruling. 
Credentials – are the elements to prove that a subject has the right to assert a particular 
identity and a way of transferring trust between entities. Credentials may be a username 
and password, a X.509 certificate or biometric data. 
Security – is the protection of the user‘s information integrity and its unauthorized access. 
Security can be seen as an authorization issue. 
Biometrics – refers to the recognition of human by the analyses of their intrinsic physical 
and/or psychological traits with the purpose of determine or confirm the identity of an 
individual. 
Identity – is specified by the set of permanent or long-lived temporal attributes associated 
with an entity. Attributes are what characterizes the identity. 
Identity Provider (IP or IdP) – is an entity that provides digital identities to users and to 
whom the users entrusts the ability to make assertions about it. The IP is responsible for 
the management of the identities information according to his/her self needs. The service 
providers that require related information about a user must contact the IP of the user in 
order to obtain that information. Since the identity provider is the entity that makes 
assertions regarding the user‘s identity a minimal amount of trust between the holder of the 
identity and the identity provider is assumed to exist.                                                                                        
Self-Identity Provider – refers to the sources of information that resides in the user 
system (laptop, P.C.). One example of self-identity provider is the Windows Card Space by 
Microsoft. 
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Service Provider (SP) – is an entity that provides services to other identities. Usually 
providing subscription based service to individuals. Examples of service providers are: 
Google Services (Email, Docs, Picasa, Gtalk, etc.), Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, 
Youtube, Flirk. 
Identity Silos – was the name given to the fortresses of digital identities of the most used 
services of the Internet. This name has origin on their restriction policy to the access of the 
information. The YahooID is an example of an Identity Silo. 
Identification – is established via authentication. In terms of user identities identification 
is the process through which one presents him/herself as the owner of the identifier by 
presenting credentials associated with that identifier. For example when one provides 
his/her identity card at a request of a police man. 
Registration – users adhere to services by registering in them. The registration establishes 
a bound between the user that is registering at the service and the service provider itself. In 
these situations users provide the services with pieces of information about them, such as 
email address, date of birth and depending on the purpose of the service, home address or 
any other shipment address and mobile may be requested, as well. 
Authentication – is the process of positively verifying the identity of an entity, as a 
prerequisite to allow access to specific resources in any system. During authentication 
process an association between an identifier and individual is certified by the individual‘s 
credentials. For example, an automobile is identified by its license plate, and that is 
authenticated as legitimate by the database of cars that are not being sought for 
enforcement purposes. Identification and Authentication are related subjects. 
Authorization – is related to access control. It is a decision to allow a particular action 
based on an identifier or attribute. Examples include the ability of a person to make claims 
on lines of credit, the right of an emergency vehicle to pass through a red light or a 
certification of a radiation-hardened device to be attached to a satellite. 
Identity Identification – is obtained by proving the association between an individual and 
an identity. For example: the association of a person with a credit or educational record. 
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Attribute Authentication – is enabled by proving the association between an entity and 
an attribute. For example: the conformation of the age of an individual. This is usually a 
two-step process, where the association between an entity and an identifier is established, 
and then a link between identifier and attribute is established.                                                                                               
Single Sign On (SSOn) – is used to refer to an authentication method, that enables users to 
only present their authentication credentials once while gaining legitimate access to several 
different services. Up until recently this was common among service providers within the 
same domain, for example inside a company an employee would have to authenticate only 
once and would immediately be authenticated to all the necessary company services 
(Centralized identity [Active directory, Kerberos]). The SSOn role is to securely transfer 
the user‘s identity, attributes and current authentication status from source site (Identity 
Provider) to the destination site (Service Provider) seamlessly. Since the user relies his/her 
authentication and assertions regarding his/her own identity to the identity provider at least 
a minimal relation of trust is assumed to exist between the user and it. 
Anonymity – is defined as the inability to identify an entity within a set of attributes. In 
order to enable it for an individual, a set of others individuals must exist with the same 
attributes, essentially making an individual indistinguishable from a set of others. The 
larger the anonymity set is, the harder will be for an attacker to distinguish an individual 
from the remaining individuals in the set. Ideally the anonymity set will be such, that the 
attacker will not be able to sufficiently single out an individual. Anonymity can be 
obtained with the use of pseudonyms (Pseudonymity). 
Pseudonymity – refers to the use of pseudonyms as identifiers. A pseudonym is an 
identifier that has no direct relation to the user‘s real identity; it is used only to refer the 
identity of the user in one or more contexts. Pseudonyms are usually employed for 
avoiding the use of the user‘s name or other attributes related to the user. They are used so 
that the real world identity behind the pseudonym is only know to the identity, and 
otherwise is hidden to all other parties. Pseudonyms belong to a specific persona and are 
typically long-term identifiers. The persona to a pseudonym mapping is in most cases 
private information, the persona to which a specific pseudonym belongs to is not publicly 
known. Pseudonymity is somehow related to unlinkability (Indirect Linking). 
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Linkability – is defined as the ability to determine whether two elements are related or 
not. In terms of user identities, linkability is the ability to determine whether two identities 
are related to the same individual. Within the context identity management, two identities 
are linkable if they share some sort of attribute that allows one to conclude that both 
identities belong to the same individual. For two identities to be not linkable they must not 
share any kind of (unique) identifier or attribute that would allow that sort of conclusion to 
be inferred. 
Privacy – is related to the protection of the attributes, preferences, and traits associated 
with and identity from being disseminated beyond the subject‘s needs in any particular 
transaction. It is built upon a foundation of good information security and that is dependent 
upon good identity management. Privacy is related to anonymity and usually it is 
controlled by a privacy policy. 
Identity Privacy – is the ability of an individual to seclude him/herself about his/her own 
personal information. In order to an individual have privacy he/she must have full control 
over the disclosure and dissemination of his personal information. 
Self-Identity Provider – is an identity provider owned by the user, it may be stored in one 
of his/her own systems, such as in a laptop. The Windows Card Space application 
(discussed later) is one example of a self-identity provider. 
Privacy policy – is a common set of rules to express privacy practices. It is employed by 
one for one or more individuals. Privacy policies are the first step towards informed 
consent for data collection. Such ruling should include: 
 Which user information will be collected. 
 The purpose given to the collected information. 
 The recipients of the collected information. 
 User‘s rights to access and modify the collected information. 
Usually the users tend to see the presentation of privacy policies by services providers 
(SP) as a sign of good faith. However, there is no practical solution to verify if the services 
providers actually adhere and comply it. Usually the most service providers state that no 
information about the user will be collected without the user consent. Nevertheless, they 
are not clear about what will be the intended use for the information gathered, especially 
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when it comes to its disclosure to third parties. Even when they claim the user information 
will not be disclosed without any consent, they contradict themselves by stating that the 
information will be always shared with their business partners. This kind of loopholes in 
the privacy policies indicates that the user cannot certainly control the collection, 
disclosure and proliferation of his/her information with accuracy, even if his/her service 
provider complies with his/her privacy policy. Moreover web applications work using a 
client-server mode, where the user initiates the interactions. This makes some of his/her 
network identifiers (L3 and perhaps L7) available to the service provider with or without 
the user consent. 
3.2  Problems of Digital Identity 
3.2.1    Identity Theft 
One of the mains digital identity drawbacks is the digital identity theft. Digital Identity 
theft is on the rise, affecting almost ten million victims in 2008 (a 22% increase from 
2007) [26]. Online there are around 55.000 phishing websites worldwide where only in the 
U.S.A are located around 43% of them. Only in the United States in 2007 $3.2 billion was 
lost due to identity theft via phishing [27]. In the countries of the European Union the 
proportion of users who have been victims of phishing remains below 10% in each 
Member State, ranging from 8% in Malta and 7% in Ireland to only 1% in France, Sweden 
and Slovakia. Most of these cases happen due the lack of awareness as well as the general 
reluctance to admit that one has been fooled. There are not available statics on total fraud 
in the EU but estimates in relation to card fraud in the EU were between $500 and $1000 
Million, and it is not necessarily decreasing. More worrying, payment fraud is increasingly 
taking a trans-national nature [28]. There are many websites selling personal data as credit 
card numbers, expiry dates, the CCV code and other security information [28]. These 
mentioned problems strangle the privacy as well as the anonymity required for a digital 
identity.  
3.2.2 Lack of Trustworthiness 
Although the lacks of the digital identity mentioned in the last sub subsection are 
important there is one more imperative: lack of trustworthiness. It exists because the 
 GLOBALiD FEDERATED DIGITAL IDENTITY 
 
29 
 
information that shapes the digital identity is not acquired and confirmed by accurate and 
reliable means, therefore, it can be false and normally most of the internet systems do not 
try to validate it. Along with the lack of digital identity certification comes the lack of 
accountability, e.g.: on forum or news comments anyone can write whatever comes to 
his/her mind without taking responsibility for it. The lack of digital identity responsibility 
has caused a lot of troubles what have been causing huge costs to many internet systems. 
Under this lack of reliability and responsibility are billions of digital identities across 
internet systems. A solution to overcome the lack of accountability of the user and 
therefore credibility the digital identity is by the acquisition of some of the user‘s physical 
features. The cost-benefit and the non-user-friendly issue of the devices needed did not 
permit the wide diffusion of this mean Online [29], even though they are effective, 
sufficient and the requirements to reinforce trustworthiness online. Some of them go 
against the users‘ identity requirements, such as their privacy reclusion. 
     The lack of trustworthiness of the identity information and the lack of control over 
the disclosure and dissemination of identity data are the main drawbacks of the digital 
identity management systems since ever. The digital identity management field of 
development is of the most importance nowadays by IT companies due to its impact on the 
eBusiness, the eGovernment, the Homebanking and the overall Internet Economy as can be 
realized by the following quotation: 
         “We declare that, to contribute to the development of the Internet Economy, 
       we will... strengthen confidence and security, through policies that... ensure the 
       protection of digital identities” [30]. 
3.2.3   A Culture of Privacy 
Privacy is important. Privacy concerns every user online, or at least it should. The loss 
of privacy may lead to the loss of anonymity, and it may carry undesirable issues, such as 
Identity theft. Most often users think that the privacy matters online are of the 
responsibility of systems and IT experts. However that is not always the case. A culture of 
security must be implemented by the users [31]. They are the owners of the information. 
Even though they are not responsible for the security of the channels of communications, 
they are responsible for the provisioning of their personal information to the systems 
online. Therefore, they are the first agents to check whether providing the information to a 
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specific system is acceptable and free of risks. They should always check whether the site 
they are visiting is of trust or not. Many identity attacks succeed because the user was 
fooled by something presented on the screen, and not because of insecure communication 
technologies, such as is the case of phishing attacks. Most of them occur not in the secured 
channel between web servers and browsers — a channel that might extend thousands of 
miles — but in the twenty or thirty centimeters between the browser and the human who 
uses it. Hence, users should take preventive measures regarding their private information in 
order to avoid actions that may lead to undesirable and uncomfortable situations [32]. One 
of these preventive measures users may take is to check if the system is trustable by 
checking the identity information provided by the browser he/she uses to access the Web 
as illustrated further.  
3.3 Authentication  
As described before, authentication is the act of proving something. Usually this 
process is made by presenting claims. Next it will be indicated and briefly described the 
authentication factors, and the most used authentication methods on the Web. 
3.3.1    Factors 
Authentication methods depend on human factors divided in three classes: 
 Something one knows (a password). 
 Something one has (a hardware token). 
 Something one is (a finger print). 
Recently, a fourth-factor of authentication was proposed to also be taken in account: 
 Somebody you know [11, 33]. 
This last factor is based on vouchering, trustworthy and tight social relationships. 
When a user, for instance, lost is password, another user of the system, sends him a 
voucher for enabling him to temporally authenticate in the system while he/she has not 
his/her authentication process ratified. This authentication method is more suitable to use 
within institutional contexts rather than in a public service online since the trustworthy 
bound is probably stronger. 
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3.3.2    Methods 
Password based Systems 
Password based authentication is a simplistic method of authentication, and is the most 
widely use form of authentication online. It has been a cornerstone of computer security 
for decades. Password based authentication is an efficient mean for sharing a secret 
between a user and a system.  In order to implement a password based authentication 
method it is not required any special software on the users‘ computers. Passwords are 
portable, users only have to memorize them, and it authenticates the user directly because 
only the user knows the password [34]. 
Password based authentication has many drawbacks. Strong passwords are not easy to 
remember and users tend to write them down, making them vulnerable to password 
thieves. When users share passwords the ability to audit and trace access to a particular 
user is less possible. Passwords may be known by the administrator of the system, and 
he/she may use it to discern the user. Plus, a single password may not be safely used in 
each affiliated web application, due to password format restrictions. Passwords are easily 
guessed and when systems accept it as plain password (seed) that is chosen by the user and 
do not implement neither delays response (account locking) nor captchas, they are easily 
vulnerable to dictionary attacks [35-36]. Furthermore, passwords sent in clear text over the 
network, are easily subject of eaves dropping and replays. They may even be manipulated 
on the exchanging channel, when no cryptographic transport protocol is implemented 
(man-in-the-middle attacks). There are several proposed schemes to overcome the issues of 
the simple password authentication, such as one time password and challenge-response. 
However, when used in a plain TCP/IP (no TLS or SSL) environment connection, the data 
can be manipulated after a successful authentication takes place. Nevertheless, it may be 
avoided by pre-authenticating the server to the client (mutual authentication), by using 
other independent methods or explicitly authenticating the transported data by digital 
signature confirmation [25]. 
Hardware Tokens 
Password based mechanisms may be strengthen by the use of hardware tokens. 
Hardware tokens are an authentication example of  ―something the user has‖ [37].  
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Benefits: 
 The use of tokens prevents a thief with a stolen password from accessing the 
web site, because he/she would have to steal the physical token from the victim 
as well.  
 They prevent the sharing of accounts since they would have to be duplicated.  
 Hardware tokens are portable. 
 No special software is required on the user‘s computer. 
Drawbacks: 
 Tokens are expensive and must be replaced or refurbished every few years. 
 Token are easy to misplace or damage. A lost token prevents a valid user from 
accessing the web site, which disrupts business or commerce. 
 Tokens are inconvenient since the user must manually enter the value of the 
token as well as the password. 
 Some token devices may not be of affordable price for the end user. 
Biometrics 
Biometrics fits on the ―something one is‖ authentication factor.  It represents physical 
(intrinsic) characteristics of a human being and depends on its biological individuality. 
Biometrics have the following characteristics [38]: 
 Universality – Generally, every person should have the same type of 
characteristic. People, who have not, as mutes and handicaps, must be 
accommodated in some other way. 
 Uniqueness – Generally, no two people have identical characteristics. 
However, identical twins are hard to distinguish. 
 Permanence – The characteristics should not vary with time. A person's face, 
for example, may change with age. 
 Collectability – The characteristics must be easily collectible and measurable. 
 Performance – The method must deliver accurate results under varied 
environmental circumstances. 
 Acceptability – The general public must accept the sample collection routines. 
Nonintrusive methods are more acceptable. 
 Circumvention – The technology should be difficult to deceive. 
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Typically used biometrics characteristics for authentication are: finger print, palm 
print, voice, face and iris.  They are automatically extracted at the time of the 
authentication process and compared with samples of the same elements kept in a database. 
Even though the use of biometrics is a hope in the authentication mechanisms of the future 
[39], it shouldn‘t be used alone because they are associated to human characteristics, and 
so they tend to change through his time life or may be even temporally affected, such are 
the cases of a person‘s face and a person with hoarseness, when facial and voice 
recognizers devices are in use. A combination of elements or factors should be used 
together according to their possible unavailability [11, 40]. Biometrics can be used for 
either positive or negative identification, e.g. a worker is allowed to access a particular area 
in a company (positive identification) or a particular person is not in the watchlist of 
wanted people (negative identification) [41]. 
Benefits:  
 Authenticate a user through a unique physical characteristic. 
 Directly authenticates the person, not indirectly through a password or token. 
 Biological features are difficult to steal, thereby they make biometric 
authentication very strong. 
 Biometric feature is eminently portable and is unlikely to be lost. 
Drawbacks: 
 It is necessary appropriated biometric hardware and software. 
 Some biometric readers may not be of affordable price for the end user. 
 False positive (allowing an invalid user).  
 False negatives (forbidding a valid user). 
3.4 Public Key Infrastructure X.509 
The Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKI) is the most widely used public key 
certificate format in both enterprise and Internet environments. The PKI is made by a set of 
methods and formats for the management of encrypted public keys and related data. The 
foundation of the Public Key infrastructure (PKI) is a pair of mathematically related 
asymmetric keys. One key can be used to encrypt a message that can only be decrypted 
using the other key. It is computationally infeasible to discover one key by knowing the 
other. The public key as it says is published to the world while the private key is kept in a 
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secure place. The public key is used for encryption and signature verification of data while 
the private key serves for decryption and signing data.  Each entity‘s identity in the PKI is 
bound to a digital certificate by the Public Key Certificate (PKC) issuer. A PKC is an 
electronic data structure that contains the entity‘s identification, issuer identification, a 
certificate describing data, and any other relevant data bound to the public keys values of 
the identity. See subsection 2.6 for a more described explanation of a PKC. PKCs are used 
in many communication systems on the Internet for authenticating the communicating 
agents (mutual authentication) and to encrypt the data in the exchanging channels [25, 42]. 
The most common communication protocol in use today that employs X.509 public key 
certificates is the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [43].  
A simple public key infrastructure starts with a certificate Authority, which issues the 
certificates to the end user.  The PKC of an entity is always signed by the PKC issuer‘s 
(CA) private key. More complex PKI can be established by the intermediation of more 
than one CA. In this case one CA must be the root CA, which owns a self-signed 
certificate and issues certificates to subordinated CA, who in turn issue certificates to the 
end users. In this case the certificates are issued in a form of tree structure, where the Root 
CA‘s certificate is on the top of the tree (root) and the subordinated CAs are further down 
the tree and inherit the trustworthiness of the root CA certificate. Each certificate on the 
chain depends on the trustworthiness of the previously certificate in the chain. Issued 
certificates have a specific period of validity. Therefore, from time to time, the CAs 
publish a Certificate Revocation List for revoking the issued certificates before the end of 
the validity period. The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is protocol that may be 
implemented by the CA to provide the revocation status of the issued certificates online.  
The several parts that make the PKI have drawbacks, and it should be followed a guide 
line of recommendations on its implementations [43]. Certificates should only contain 
minimal information about the subject, since once the certificate is present, all the 
attributes and data in the certificate are disclosed to the verifying party. Additionally the 
subject‘s privacy may be violated, since his/her/it activities at different sites may be 
correlated by his/her/its public key.  
The PKI X.509 became an important element on Digital Identity Management. 
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3.5 Transport Protocols 
3.5.1 Transport Layer Security Protocol 
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the successor of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
by IETF, a protocol that provides security for communications over networks, such as the 
Internet, by the implementation of cryptographic techniques. It is not necessary 
appropriated software in order to establish a TLS session between two end points. The TLS 
protocol is an application layer protocol (OSI Model), it runs on top of the TCP/IP protocol 
(transport and network layers) and encrypts its segments. The data is only protected while 
it is being exchanged in the channel; if data is stored on the end points they are no longer 
protected. The TLS does not depend on any specific cryptographic algorithm but rather on 
a set of them pertaining to key exchange, encryption, hashing, and digital signatures. A 
Cipher suite of cryptographic algorithms is agreed after a TLS session has been established 
by the end points of the communication in order to protect the data exchanged between 
them.    
The TLS is made up of two layers:  
 The TLS record protocol: encrypts the data to be exchanged. 
 The TLS Handshake protocol: deals with the authentication of the 
communicating agents and with cipher suite agreement. 
The protocol supports several authentication modes: 
 Total anonymity: In the total anonymity mode there is no authentication of the 
communicating parties. This mode is included for backward compatibility only. 
 Authentication server: Only the server authenticates itself to the client. The 
client by itself remains anonymous. 
 Mutual authentication: Both parties in the communication authenticates to 
each other by exchanging their respective public key certificates and 
appropriate proofs of possession of the private keys. 
The TLS protocol has several drawbacks. It allows the discernment of the parties 
involved in the communication because the certificates are exchanged in the clear [44]. 
The use of TLS generates an increase of the connection overhead and it may decrease the 
speed of the connection. The TLS protocol is wide used to secure the WWW, by serving as 
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a secured channel of communications for the HTTP protocol (HTTPS).  The IETF is 
redefining the TLS as a high priority (http://tools.ietf.org/wg/tls) due to a recently 
discovered problem on the TLS handshake mechanisms that may lead to an attack (man-in-
the-middle) [45]. 
3.5.2  HTTP 
HTTP is widely used on the World Wide Web for transferring hyper media 
information between systems that usually runs on top of the TCP/IP protocols, usually on 
port 80. Usually the agents of an HTTP sessions are a client (user‘s browser) and a server 
(the data source). 
The HTTP uses Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) a subset of Uniform Resource 
Identifiers (URIs) for the identification of the resources to access. The format of an URI 
(defined by http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2396.txt) is the following:  
 <scheme name> : <hierarchical part> [? <query>] [#<fragment>] 
The hierarchical part is separated in <authority> and <path> as showed next. 
 <scheme>://<authority><path>?<query>#fragment.  
The <scheme> tag represents the protocol being used. The <authority> tag represents 
the server. The <path> represents the path to the resource <authority> (server). The 
question mark represents the introduction of a query and the # represents a particular 
secondary resource (such as an html macro). Resources communicate by making requests. 
The main HTTP request formats are:  
 GET – a GET request, as the name says, is performed for getting HTML 
formatted data from a system. 
 POST – the POST request is used to submit data to be processed by the system 
to which the post is effectuated to. Usually these results are new resources, 
update of resources or deletion of existing resources. 
The HTTP exchange data on the clear, therefore in order to protected the data 
transmitted, the HTTP messages must be send over a secure channel HTTPS (HTTP/TLS). 
When a communication between agents is being established over an HTTP secure channel, 
the URI scheme usually shown is HTTPS. Users may know whether the authority they are 
reaching is secure by looking to the certificate warning of their browser in the address bar. 
Figure 2 shows it on the Firefox Web Browser. 
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Figure 2- Certificate information of Twitter.com. 
On the Figure 3 it is shown that the communication with the specific website is not 
secure. 
 
Figure 3 - Certificate information of CGD. 
Figure 3 shows the identity information of the digital certificate made available by the 
service. This way the user may check whether accessing the specific server is secure or not 
by looking at the available information provided by the service‘s certificate. As it is 
indicated by the information window, the connection to the web site is encrypted to 
prevent eavesdropping. Therefore attempts from an eavesdropper to read the data 
exchanged between the browser and the server will be unsuccessful. The Certificate 
Authority that provided the certificate is also shown. It is the well-known commercial CA 
VeriSign, Inc, which indicates that the entity that holds the certificate is reliable. 
The scheme of the URI is HTTPS, which also indicates that the connection with the 
server is made over a secure channel, probably TLS. In such case the TCP port used will 
be 443 and not 80. When the website is not trustful, firefox display a message similar as 
the shown by Figure 4: 
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Figure 4 - Unsecure connection warning from the Firefox Web Browser. 
In order to understand how HTTP and TLS are displaced in the layer of 
communication, the following figure is shown. 
HTTPS
HTTP
TLS
TCP
IP
 
Figure 5 - The displacement of HTTP and TLS on the communication layer. 
In the Figure 5 it is illustrated that the HTTPS protocol is defined by the HTTP 
protocol running on top of the encrypted transport layer security. Thereby it is possible to 
securely transfer the information carried in the systems communication channels because 
the TLS segments are encrypted by the protocol. 
3.6 Discussion 
In this section it was provided an approach to the digital identity management. Some 
definitions implied in the specifics of digital identity management were presented. It was 
also pointed out that users are the first responsible agents on the provision of their 
particular data since they are the data suppliers. Several authentication factors and methods 
were indicated and described as important elements of a digital identity management 
system. It was told that the authentication method to implement in an identity management 
system should be chosen according to the security context required by the system and that 
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several systems failures occurred due to the weakness of the system authentication method. 
More efficient means of authentication were introduced, such as the use of smart cards 
with digital certificates and biometrics (hardware tokens) as a possible means of 
implementation to overcome the authentication issues.  
The Public Key Infrastructure is with no doubt an important mechanism for the 
management of digital identities. It implements mechanism that provides authenticity to 
the identity and allows the actors to mutually identify themselves legitimately. The PKI is 
also a means to prevent identity theft. The implementation of a PKI also protects the 
integrity of the messages exchanged between systems by the use of a signing mechanism 
and provides security against eaves droppers in the channel of communication by 
implementing encryption techniques.  
The key protocols for the transportation of identity data and mechanisms to inform 
how a user may know if the connection he/she is establishing with the service is secure and 
whether the service is a reliable one were also indicated. 
Next it will be introduced the different models for managing digital identity 
information. 
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4 Digital Identity Management Models 
Identity Management is traditionally seen from the service provider‘s point of view, 
meaning that it is an activity undertaken by the service provider to manage the users‘ 
identities. Service providers also took as granted that users need to authenticate to them, 
otherwise they do not need to authenticate themselves to the users. This drawback is the 
cause for the many phishing attacks Online that have been causing a lot of costs to the 
services providers, users, and business companies working Online [46-47].  
The lack of an Identity Layer in the Network ISO framework with the dynamization 
and the user customization of web applications forced the creation of systems to manage 
users‘ identity [3]. Several models were created to tackle the management task.  
Firstly in this section it will be introduced the relations definitions implied in the 
digital identity management specification. Throughout, it will be mentioned, described, 
explained and analyzed the various models used by the millions of services providers 
online for the management of their users‘ identity data. The objective is to know their 
benefits and pitfalls in order to project a digital identity management solution that can 
benefit both users and service providers, and avoid the drawbacks of the traditional identity 
management. This new digital identity management solution will be introduced, described, 
explained, analyzed and compared with other existing identity solutions in the subsection 
number 8.6 of this master‘s thesis. 
In order to understand the identity models, it should be well understood first the 
relation between the different terms implied in the digital identity management subject. 
The most important terms are: entity, identity, characteristics or attributes, identifiers and 
unique identifiers. Further on this thesis others terms will be introduced. But for now let‘s 
observe how the already introduced ones are associated. 
Figure 6 illustrates the relation between entities, identities, characteristics / attributes 
and identifiers. An entity can be any institution, device or person, usually called subject. 
Each entity is an identity and each one has several characteristics. These characteristics 
may be identifiers for identities, and some of these identifiers may be unique identifiers, as 
an Email and a Civil ID number are. Each one of these entities is associated to one or more 
identities that in its turn are associated to several own characteristics / identifiers.   
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Figure 6 - Identity Scheme. 
4.1 The system-centric model 
The system-centric model was the first solution to appear for managing users‘ access 
to a service provider. It is called the traditional model of identity management because it is 
widely used by the online services providers for a long time. In this model the service 
providers act as both identity provider and service provider in an united working block 
[48]. This line of work isolates service providers from each other‘s because users get 
separate credentials to each service they want to use.  
John Smith
Name: John Smith
Age:    12-12-1980
Address: abc
Email:   johns@x.com
             johnny.boy@y.com
gamer.js@z.com
Nationality: Portugal
John Smith
Username: JohnS
Password:  xpto1
Name: John Smith
Age: 12-12-1980
Address:      abc
Email:         johns@x.com
John Smith
Username: LordZ
Password:  “#df5
Email: gamer.js@z.com
ShopX: IP+SP GameX: IP+SP
 
Figure 7 - Traditional Identity Management Model. 
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In Figure 7 it can be seen that every system compounds the IP (Identity Provider) and 
de SP (Service Provider) in a united working block. The user has a registered persona 
(digital identity) to every service he/she is using. The IP of the SP gives the user the 
identifiers and the credentials to access the SP. The next section describes the benefits and 
pitfalls of this identity management model. 
4.1.1 Benefits and Pitfalls 
What most characterizes this model in terms of benefits and pitfalls are the pitfalls it 
has. This model is most recognizable by the several access credentials users need to keep. 
Within the context of the traditional identity management model users have one digital 
identity for every service they use. Users cannot use the digital identity they have in one 
system in order to login into another. Services providers do not allow it. The traditional 
model implements the traditional password based method for authenticating users. This 
authentication method has many security drawbacks, but its simplicity is the primary 
reason for its wide use [25]. Having multiple access credentials to manage, leads users to 
be sloppier about it, as well as reluctant at the moment of adopting (other) online 
commerce solutions, which somewhat limits the scalability, the cost efficiency of the 
services and results in several of them not reaching their full potential [48-50]. This 
plurality of access credentials does not offer users full control over the disclosure and 
dissemination of their personal information to others [26-27]. Less frequently used 
credentials are easily forgotten and may even get in the possession of others very easily. 
Since users‘ personal information is scattered across several systems and there is no means 
by which users can monitor disclosed information, their privacy and anonymity may not be 
guaranteed. Moreover, the concerns (http://identityfight.org) of the whereabouts of their 
identity information, lead users to provide false information most of the times [51]. The 
services by themselves do not implement any mechanisms to certify that the information 
users provide is true and accurate. This leads users to be less accountable about the actions 
they take, because the users‘ real identity may not be discerned, making both users and 
service provides not reliable at all.  
From the service providers‘ perspective, they have the double effort of providing the 
service, managing the users‘ information and make the authorization assertions in order to 
allow users to access its services. It leads to the duplication of the cost for the maintenance 
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of the whole system. Nonetheless, the fact that within the context of this model the service 
provider deals the users‘ access to its services by its own identity management system, has 
the benefit of the information about the users being always firsthand information. Its 
integrity is therefore assured. Services using this line of work for managing their users‘ 
digital identity rarely implement secure communications, becoming more fragile to several 
kinds of attacks. This model for managing users‘ information is very sensible to the so 
called phishing attacks. These attacks are getting precise every day and because of it many 
services were offline and consequently, the costs for maintenance of the service rise. 
In spite of this all flaws that this digital identity management model has, it is widely 
diffused, as it can be realized by our experience as users and by the number of credentials 
each one of us has to manage. 
4.1.2 Password managers 
Password managers are programs that concentrate all the digital identity credentials 
data into a single repository. This allows users to have a means by which they can manage 
their digital identity credentials in a more efficient and secure manner, avoiding typing the 
credentials data in the login forms. However, this kind of applications is still not avoiding 
the multi credentialism of users and, in order to use it, some kind of appropriated software 
is mandatory. Users still have to register at the services in the traditional way, by filling 
information forms. Users still may lose the access to any of their identities outside of the 
software scope. Thereby, it has the same flaws than the traditional digital identity 
management model since it is just a piece of software for users managing their credentials 
and not either a solution to strength users‘ privacy, anonymity and information scattering 
control, or a digital identity model in the first place. Plus, it gathers the credentials users 
have in one single place which increases the negative effect of a successfully identity deft 
attack. Even though it is, in one hand, a value for identity theft prevention, in another, it 
brings no relevant value to the protection of the privacy and anonymity of the users 
whatsoever (see lastpass.com). 
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4.2 Toward a unified login approach 
In order to alleviate the users‘ credentials (identity) management overload, the services 
started to request an email address for the credentials (digital identity identifier) of every 
digital identity that access the services. This way, users only have to manage the different 
passwords they have for every digital identity they hold, when systems request a different 
and specific password format. This technique decreases the probability of users losing their 
access to services and eases the recovery of the access to their digital identity (account).  
Using the users‘ email address for the representation of their digital identities does not 
protect both their privacy and anonymity. Otherwise, it increases the risks of a stolen 
identity and the probability of users loose either their privacy or (and) anonymity is now 
much higher, because the email address allows the discernment of users by the correlation 
of these (unique) identifiers. Moreover, users are still required to provide their particular 
information by filling forms.  All the flaws of the traditional identity management model 
still existing in this approach. 
@p
User
@
SP1
Email address
SP2
passwordA passwordB
passwordC
 
Figure 8 - Towards a user centric login approach. 
In the Figure 8 it is illustrated a scheme of the association of the user with two service 
providers within a context of a user-centric login approach. The user has an email address 
provided by the @p email provider that is used as the credential username to access the 
SP1 and SP2 service providers. This way the user only has to manage the different 
passwords in each system, when they request different specific password formats. 
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4.3 The Federated Identity Model 
The federated identity concept was introduced to address user digital identity 
management overload by creating a framework for systems interoperability. It establishes a 
set of rules and standards in order to create a reliable and secure namespace for the 
exchanging of identity information between source (usually users via their identity 
provider) and target (usually web applications), allowing users to keep their personal 
information less scattered across the Web applications, control its disclosure and 
dissemination, monitor its scrutiny and displacement, control their privacy, keep their 
anonymity protected, and access several web applications seamlessly by using only one 
digital identity [48]. 
The Federated Identity Model is a recent concept to address the management of digital 
identities. It is characterized for its user centric basis, focusing directly on the seamless 
user cross-domain. The cross-domain is achieved by the Single Sign On mechanism which 
improves the operational efficiency of all services within the federation domain. In order to 
enable users to cross domains seamlessly a set of agreements, standards and technologies 
have to be enable by the federated members. Within a federated identity context the 
identity provider and the service provider are detached [48]. This way the service providers 
only have to direct their attention to the service provisioning while the identity provider 
takes care of providing digital identities to users and managing their information. The 
identity provider is therefore the responsible agent for sending authorization assertions to 
service providers in order to enable users to access it.  
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U: JohnS
P: eFjhLKI
U: AdamR
P: FgbVbKh
P: xd4Fgb
U:TomB
P: yulhJkl
P: eFjhLKI
U: user_A
P: FgbVbKh
U: user_B
P: yulhJkl
U: user_X
Legend
U – user
P – pseudonym of association
IP# - Identity Provider
SP# - Service Provider
P: xd4FgbI
U: user_C
IPxIPz
SP3 SP1 SP2
 
Figure 9 - Federated Identity Management Model Framework. 
As it can be observed, the digital identity provisioning is done by a system detached 
from the ones that are providing the services (SPs). Within this federated context, users 
have only one set of credentials to manage in order to access all the services of the enabled 
federation. User ―TomB‖ accesses the SP3 via ―IPz‖, as it can be correlated by the 
pseudonym ―yulhjkl‖. The user ―JohnS‖ has a similar scenario as ―TomB‖. The user 
―AdamR‖ uses two services, the SP1 and SP2, correlated by his pseudonyms ―FgbVbKh‖ 
and ―xd4Fb‖. The use of pseudonyms has the benefit of avoiding the discernment of users 
by the correlation of all the users‘ identifiers (pseudonyms).  
The fact that the service providers are accepting assertions from the identity provider 
does not mean that some sort of circle of trust exist among them. The kind of trust required 
between a service provider and an identity provider depends highly on the type of 
assertions being exchanged, and the context in which they are being exchanged. It has 
more sense within the context of a company a high trust requisite to exist. Thereby, it 
makes sense if some sort of a company‘s service provider only accepts assertions from the 
identity provider inside the company (intranet), while for an online business provider it 
would make more sense to accept assertions from any identity provider in order to 
maximize the number of clients [23].  
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4.3.1 Benefits and Pitfalls 
The Federated Identity Management Model entails significant benefits to all parties 
involved. The identity provider can focus on the improvement of the users‘ information 
management, such as users can have a better control over the disclosure and dissemination 
of their information and monitor its scrutiny and displacement as well. The identity 
provider can also focus on the improvement of the authentications methods (strong and 
mutual) as well as creating mechanisms to verify whether the information users provide is 
accurate or not. With the design of this model, users enjoy the benefits that single sign on 
provides them, since they only need one set of credentials to log in at the identity provider 
to access the services of the federation, seamlessly. This benefit comes together with the 
benefit of users not revealing their credentials to any of the service providers they access 
to, which contributes to the preservation of their privacy and anonymity. The redundancy 
and scalability problems of the older digital identity management systems are thereby 
decreased. The service providers delegate user account management tasks, such as 
password resets or profile information changes to the identity providers, while being 
enabled to acquire updated user information from them. The fact that service providers are 
relieved of the management of the users‘ information and authentication enables them to 
focus in the improvement of the business, which makes the federated identity model a 
leverage to boost the e-commerce Online [52]. 
Like any of the other models referred previously, the federated identity model is not 
free from drawbacks. The insertion of the single sign on mechanism requires exchanging 
of users‘ information between the identity provider and the service providers. Therefore, it 
demands that all parties secure their communication channels (implementation of HTTPS) 
against eavesdropping based attacks, in order to avoid undesirable leaks of information, but 
such demand is not always applied [23]. Within the context of this model the cost of a 
stolen credential is now much higher. If the attacker has in his/her possession the user 
credentials, the attacker gains access to all service providers the user is federated with and 
to all the user‘s personal information. The same is applied when the identity provider is ill-
intended, but users may avoid such systems easily by checking the identity information 
provided by their browser and avoiding following doubtful information or adhering to 
suspicious systems.  
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4.4 Discussion 
In this chapter two different models for the management of the users‘ identities and 
their access to the web applications (services) were introduced and described. Each model 
benefits and pitfalls were also analyzed. By the analyses effectuated to both identity 
management models it may be asserted that the most efficient model for managing the 
users‘ personal information and their access to the services, is the federated identity 
management model, either from users‘ point of view or from the point of view of the 
services providers. The federated identity model splits very well the jobs and concerns of 
each actor, by establishing a solution to regulate more efficiently the functionalities of each 
one. This model also reduces the impact of the drawbacks that could not be eliminated and 
that could be a potential prone of identity violation. Such is the case of the implementation 
of strong authentication mechanisms for avoiding the deep disadvantage of users loosing or 
be stolen the access to their federated digital identity. It must be also underlined that even 
though the federated identity model specifies guidelines for securing the users‘ identity 
data, users are the first verification and decision point in what regards to the certification of 
the security and reliability of the system (web application, service provider) which they 
desire to adhere to. A system that may not look suspicious could be an ill-intended identity 
provider or service provider and therefore users should avoid them. Therefore users should 
always certify whether the system is reliable by looking for references about it and/or 
check any available identity information that the browser they are using to access the 
service provides. In my opinion, in order to avoid ill intended identity or service providers 
that could put at stake the users‘ identity data, some sort of classification mechanism could 
be created by the most recognized identity or service providers, such that would supply 
users with a trust reference classification in order to let them know which system may be 
suspicious and which may not. This way the most diffused services Online would without 
doubt contribute to take the ill-intended identity and service providers out of business.  
Due to its excellent benefits, federated identity should be implemented by the web 
applications instead of the traditional identity model. Nevertheless, its implementation may 
be slow and not so well articulated by the systems. The cost of modifying the existing 
digital identity management systems in order to implement federated identity is a tough 
hindrance to its implementation and diffusion across the web. However, such may be 
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easily overcome by the potential of the federated identity model to leverage the boost of e-
commerce transactions, and enrich-business market [52]. 
By the analysis of these models and approaches on digital identity management, it can 
be asserted that the digital identity management discipline has been getting closer to the 
user, making him/her the center of the management process and the decision maker in the 
management of the user‘s identity. It may be said that the federated identity management 
model is the best model for managing users‘ identity because it is more secure and reliable 
than the traditional model as it may be concluded by the analysis made to each model's 
benefits and pitfalls. 
 
 GLOBALiD FEDERATED DIGITAL IDENTITY 
 
51 
 
5 Federated Identity 
The federated identity is outlined by a variety of particularities. These particularities 
should be known and understood in order to comprehend the federated identity concept. 
This chapter mentions and describes the most important characteristics of identity 
federation. 
5.1 Federation Requirements 
In order to establish a federation, the members must agree in a common of conditions 
[50]: 
 Define a common framework built on industry standards, independent of 
specific implementations and networks as well as how its use will be 
accomplished. 
 Assure the privacy safety of the users‘ information by keeping it secret, within 
the federation, and according to international privacy regulations. The users‘ 
personal information is only provided upon their approval. 
 Protect the channels of information exchanging from any kind of attacks by 
applying to the security guidelines of the standards used for implementing 
identity federation. 
 Assure the users have seamless access to any services of the federation and that 
their identity is only federated with any of the services of the federation upon 
their approval. 
 Provide a way to establish trust amongst federation participants by setting a 
circle of trust between the members of the federations. 
 Define rules for federation engagement, such as membership guidelines. 
 Contribute for the common wealth of the federation. 
5.1.1 Circle of trust 
By setting a circle of trust the federated members agree to trust on: 
 Any service within the federation. 
 The Information from any service within the federation. 
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 The federated identity provider assertions. 
 
Figure 10 - Circle of Trust of an Identity Federation. 
5.2 Who can be an identity provider? 
In my point of view, when having trustworthy as a baseline of work, the most suitable 
entities to be an identity provider are: 
 Governments. 
 Banks. 
 Telecommunications Enterprises. 
Governments are the most suitable entity to be an identity provider, since they already 
manage the identities of their citizens. Plus, they already have the identity management 
structure defined and built. Moreover, most of the governments of the world already have 
their citizen identity information being managed by electronic systems, what could lead to 
an easy implementation of digital identity provisioning to Internet users.  
Banks are other entities than are suitable to be identity providers for web users. They 
already have gathered accurate personal information of the clients and already have been 
providing home banking services to their clients. They could provide digital identity to 
their clients easily. 
Telecommunications companies have the upside of owning a telecommunications 
network framework. Since they have accurate personal information about their clients, 
digital identity provisioning could be quickly implemented. Furthermore, they already 
provide digital identity to their clients from the fact that each one has a phone identity 
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(phone number). By providing digital identity to their clients it would enable them to 
improve their business online which, somewhat would easy the commercial transactions. 
5.3 Message Exchange Mechanisms 
In order to enable identity federation between identity providers and service providers, 
identity messages must be exchange. Next will be mentioned the message exchanging 
mechanisms [25]. 
5.3.1 Browser-based 
In a browser-based message exchange mechanism, the browser is the agent responsible 
for the bidirectional redirection of the requests between the service provider and the 
identity provider. 
 
Figure 11 - Browser based message exchange. 
Figure 11 illustrates the browser based message exchange flow when establishing a 
federation between an identity provider (IP) and a service provider (SP). 
Assuming that no prior interaction existed before between any of the actors (user, SP 
and IP): 
1. The user requests for a resource on the service provider. 
2. The service provider not recognizing the user, builds an authentication request 
and sends it to the IP (chosen by the user), in this case, via HTTP redirect or 
HTTP post. 
3. The IP receives the authentication requests, processes it and applies any 
relevant policy. 
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4. The IP authenticates the user. 
5. The IP builds the authentication response and sends it to the SP via a browser 
redirect or a post. 
6. The SP receives the authentication response from the IP and processes it. 
7. The SP creates the necessary authentication context for the user (session) and 
redirects the user to the source request on 1. 
5.3.2 Client-based 
In a client based message exchange scenario the bidirectional redirection of the 
requests between the service provider and identity provider is established by a client 
installed on the users machine. 
 
Figure 12 - Client based message exchange. 
Assuming that no prior interaction existed before between any of the actors (user, SP 
and IP): 
1. The user requests for a resource on the service provider. 
2. The service provider not recognizing the user, builds a authentication requests 
and sends it to the IP (chosen by the user), in this case, in a special form 
understandable by the identity client. The browser recognizes the format and 
redirects the request to the identity client application. 
3. The identity client processes the request and selects the identity provider, 
which may be indicated by the user.  
4. The IP authenticates the user and builds the authentication response to send to 
the identity client.  
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5. The identity client processes the response, extracts the security token and may 
optionally cache it for later use. The identity client creates an authentication 
response with the secure security token and sends it to the SP. 
6. The SP processes the authentication response received and creates an 
authentication context (session with the user‘s browser) for the user with the 
security token carried by the authentication response. The establishment of a 
session with the user‘s browser is made to avoid significant overhead in future 
re-authentications. 
7. The SP redirects the user to the resource requested on 1. 
When the user is already authenticated on the IP (point 4.) prior to a SP authentication 
request, he/she could be request for re-authentication by the SP authentication request. This 
is an option SPs have when requesting IPs to authenticate users. 
5.4 Account linking  
When an identity provider is asserting an identity to a service provider, the linking of 
the users‘ identity between the identity provider and the service provider may be 
established in two different ways. 
5.4.1 Direct Linking 
The direct linking of a user‘s identity is made by the use of a unique identifier. The 
Figure 13 illustrates it. 
SP PersonaIP Persona
 
Figure 13 - Direct linking. 
The direct linking of the user‘s identity (Persona) with service providers raises privacy 
issues for the user. Since global unique identifiers are being used for the linking of the 
user‘s identity between the IP and SP, the user‘s identity as well as their general common 
activities can be easily discerned by the service providers from the correlation of their 
identity identifiers. Figure 14 illustrates one possible scenario of identifiers correlation. 
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SP1
IP Persona
Persona
SP2Persona
SP3Persona
 
Figure 14 - Federated direct linking. 
The Figure 14 illustrates that if the SPs correlate their identity data information, they 
will be enabled to discern the user easily. 
5.4.2  Indirect linking 
In the indirect linking of the users‘ identity between the IP and SP, the identity 
provider asserts a per-unique (web application) identifier (pseudonym) to the users‘ 
identity for the representation of the user in the service provider as illustrated in the Figure 
15.  
Pseudonym SP PersonaIP Persona X X
 
Figure 15 - Indirect linking. 
This way the identity of the user cannot be discerned by the correlation of the 
pseudonym, protecting the users‘ privacy as it is illustrated in Figure 16. 
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SP1
IP Persona
X
Y
Z
PersonaX
SP2PersonaY
SP3PersonaZ
 
Figure 16 - Federated Indirect Linking. 
If the service providers try to correlate their users‘ identifiers they won‘t realized that 
the X, Y and Z identifiers actually represent the same user in all services. This way it is 
proved that pseudonymity leads to anonymity. 
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6 Federated Identity State of Art 
This section is addressed to the existing initiatives for the implementation of federated 
identity management systems. The main ones are mentioned, described, explained and 
analyzed in order to find out through its benefits, pitfalls and the need of users which, 
standards are more suitable for the development of the Global identity federated identity 
provider, the identity provider to be developed under the study result of this master thesis. 
The standards will not be deeply explained from the technical point of view, but rather 
from their main features, because it would be redundant to make a thorough analysis of 
every protocol, since right now the differences between most of them are minimal, and 
they either follow the same guidelines or converged into a unified line of work. In different 
standards, there are similarities in their main features as well as in its implementation and 
resources used. Therefore, since the principles behind each standard converge in most of 
their specifics, the aim of the analysis taken is to find out which federated identity 
standard(s) could have a wide range of interoperability and acceptance by the online 
systems and which one(s) is/are more suitable to implement on the GlobaliD identity 
provider. Discontinued federated identity standards will not be taken in consideration. 
Upon the selection of the initiative(s) for implementing federated identity in the 
GlobaliD identity framework, the chosen one(s) will be explained in a deeper detail in a 
section for the purpose. The analysis of the state of the art will start from the point that 
there is no single industry standard meeting all of the federation requirements. The 
following table indicates the most known existing standards that approach the federated 
identity management model. Table 2 lists the standards that will be discussed: 
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Table 2 - Federated Identity Initiatives. 
Initiative Consortium Version Date Type 
OpenID The OpenID 
Foundation 
2.0 12/2007 Browser 
Windows Live ID Microsoft 6.0 7/2007 Browser 
Liberty ID-FF Liberty Alliance 1.2 11/2003 Browser 
Client 
WS-Federation IBM, 
Microsoft,VerySign 
1.1 12/2006 Browser 
Client 
Shibboleth Internet2 1.3  Browser 
Identity 
Metasystem 
Microsoft 1.0 7/2007 Client 
SAML OASIS 2.0 03/2005 Browser 
 
In section 4.3, the federated identity model was analyzed within the context of online 
services. Therefore in order to address to the state of art of the existing standards for 
implementing identity federation, I will start with the most diffused ones online, the 
OpenID and the Windows Live ID. 
6.1 OpenID 
OpenID [53] was originally developed by Brad Fitzpatrick in the summer of 2005, to 
authenticate commentators in LiveJournal‘s blogs in order to avoid spam. The OpenID is a 
simple, open, decentralized, free framework, user-centric Internet digital identity system, 
that is highly distributed and diffused in/by the many services online [54]. The purpose of 
the OpenID is to provide users with single sign-on in services that do not require strong 
security. It has its own authentication protocol [55], such roughly follows the browser-
based mechanism described previously. However, it deviates in first steps, adding 
communication between target site and source site prior to the main redirect sequence. 
The OpenID protocol takes advantage of already existing internet technology such as 
URI, HTTP, SSL, Diffie-Hellman. It was designed from the beginning to use only standard 
HTTP(S) requests and responses, not requiring any special additional capabilities of the 
user-agent or other client software. OpenID start from the point that users already have 
digital identities online such as blogs, photo sharing, etc. Firstly, it used the URI or XRI as 
globally unique identifiers for the representation of each user identity. But in the version 
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2.0 of the protocol it provided a non-mandatory pseudonym mechanism for avoiding the 
discerning of users by the correlation of URIs in order to protect their anonymity. The 
OpenID last version also provides mechanisms for the implementation of strong 
authentication, such as the use of smartcards, but this factor is optional. 
URI‘s were initially chosen as identifiers because they were already and widely 
adopted identifiers, which were not only unique but also easily recognizable. This way a 
user could easily tie content to his identity by using the URI of his personal web page as an 
identifier, which was particularly convenient in blogging environments were the user‘s 
identifier would be the URL of his own blog. The use of URI as identifiers can easily 
dereference and lead to the users‘ identity provider as well as it immediately exposes user 
information to any party that comes across the identifier. XRI is an additional resolution 
mechanism for URIs by OASIS. Therefore they were adopted as suitable identifiers for 
OpenID and were introduced in the OpenID 2.0 specification.  
OpenID does not mandate any specific structure of personae and/or accounts. However 
it is obviously expected by OpendID designers that the primary way of OpenID usage is 
the use of single or few globally-unique identifiers.  The OpenID has the flexibility of 
users being capable to delegate the authentication of their URI to any identity provider, so 
that if one deems that the identity provider is not trustworthy anymore or is going to end 
services in an foreseeable future, he/she may simply switch to another identity provider, 
without losing his/her URI identity reference. 
OpenID is not free of flaws, it has some security limitations [56]. Besides the pitfalls 
that it has for being an identity federation mechanism, certain indications must be followed 
in order to avoid eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks. However these indications 
are only optional. OpenID users are still forced to manage duplicate information in 
multiple services and if the service requires any extra information about the user, it must 
collect that from the user, validate it, if necessary, and store it locally. OpenID agents 
cannot interoperate with agents using other identity protocols.  
6.2 Windows Live ID 
Windows Live ID [57] (WLID) is the last evolutionary state of the Microsoft Internet 
Passport. It enables users with a decentralized authentication feature. For the representation 
of users, the windows live id uses per-site specific unique identifiers (unique pseudonyms) 
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[58]. Windows live id allows an association of all the WLIDs the users have, this way they 
only need to login once at the WLID‘s IP to access the services associated with the others 
WLID‘s of the association. Any other information that the web applications request about 
the users must be provided by themselves by typing it in the forms the services provide for 
it or by authorizing the IP to allow the services to access the information. This last feature 
is only performed with the user prior authorization. The Windows Live ID may be 
accessed using WS-Trust, CardSpace or even Authentication Dial In User Service 
(RADIUS). It may be used in an identity federated scenario by using WS-Federation [59], 
as well. Moreover, the WLID became an OpenID IP recently. 
6.3 The Liberty Alliance Project 
The Liberty Alliance Project [60] is an initiative from the Liberty Alliance. The 
Liberty Alliance is a consortium of more than 150 organizations including technology 
vendors, consume-facing companies, educational organizations and governments from 
around the world, as well as hundreds of additional organizations that participates in 
Liberty‘s various open community Special Interests Group (SiGs). The aim of the Liberty 
Alliance Project is to provide open standards, guidelines and best practices for network 
identity management, within a federation context. Decentralization and openness are the 
main goals of the Alliance. In order to address that The Alliance released some 
specifications [61] in three cumulative phases: 
 Phase1 – Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF) - ID-FF is the core of the 
framework, federated identity services, single sign-on, session management, 
account linking, and privacy. This phase is now merged with SAML2.0. 
 Phase2 – Identity Web services Federation (ID-WSF) - ID-WSF enables the 
users‘ management sharing of their attributes and ID to SP and personalized 
Services. 
 Phase3 – Identity Services Interface Specifications (ID-SIS) - services 
providing such as contact book, calendar, geo-location, presence, profiling. 
All the three phases are designed to build on top of each other: Phase 2 (ID-WSF) 
relies on the Phase 1 (ID-FF) and Phase 3 (ID-SIS) instantiates the ID-WSF framework. 
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6.3.1 ID-FF 
The Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF) is the core of the Liberty Federation 
framework. The ID-FF follows both browser and client based message exchange as 
described in section 5.3. ID-FF supports mechanisms for authentication context, e.g. the 
user of smart cards. The ID-FF 1.2 specifications were used by OASIS to be converged 
with their SAML V1.1 specification and the Internet2 Shibboleth, forming the foundation 
of SAML V2.0. The differences between the version 2.0 of SAML and the ID-FF 
specifications are of structural and formatting matter and not change any of the 
characteristics that ID-FF already had. Therefore I will not provide a promiscuous 
description of the ID-FF 1.2 characteristics. Later I will introduce SAML and its features. 
Moreover, SAML V2.0 substituted the ID-FF specification in the alliance project 
architecture.  
6.3.2 ID-WSF 
The ID-WSF builds upon ID-FF to provide a framework for identity-based web 
services in a federated network identity environment. It specifies a SOAP-based invocation 
framework, defining a SOAP binding message for the user information exchanging 
between identity providers and service providers that can be established over the HTTP 
protocol. The ID-WSF does not specify any contents for the SOAP Body, allowing the 
development of identity services within the context of ID-WSF. The body of the SOAP 
messages can be used to share the users‘ personal information across identity and service 
providers by keeping their security and privacy untouched. The WS-Security from WS-* is 
the specifications that provides this functionality to ID-WSF. 
6.3.3 ID-SIS 
ID-SIS is a collection of interoperable identity services. It is built on top of the ID-
WSF framework, which permits web services to communicate among them by using 
SOAP over HTTP calls. The specifications define the specific syntax and semantics for 
sharing different slices of identity attributes over the services. The services provided by the 
ID-SIS can include ones such as registration, contact book, calendar, geo-location, 
presence, or alerts. 
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The next figure illustrates the architecture of the Liberty Alliance Federation 
Framework. 
 
Figure 17 - The Liberty Alliance specifications architecture. 
6.4 WS-* Services 
The WS-Federation Services [62] is an initiative of many companies such as 
Microsoft, IBM, BEA, IBM, Microsoft, RSA Security and VeriSign. It relies on other 
models in order to enable identity federation among services. The WS-Federation is a 
group of specifications used together in order to activate identity federation to entities. The 
WS-Federation Services are defined by a group of specifications: 
 WS-Security. 
 WS-Secure Conversation. 
 WS-Policy. 
 WS-Federation. 
 WS-Trust. 
6.4.1 WS-Security  
The WS-Security specifications define the SOAP security extensions providing data 
integrity and confidentiality. It defines how to attach extensions and encryption to SOAP 
messages, and the insertion of the XML security tokes in the headers of the messages. WS-
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Security does not support secure communications, it relies on the WS-SecureConversation 
to achieve the security of the messages exchanging channel. 
6.4.2 WS-SecureConversation 
The WS-SecureConversation defines the rules by which security tokens are created 
and shared between the evolving parties of the federation. It uses the security context 
tokens to apply it. The WS-SecureConversation defines how the process of the encrypting 
and signing keyshare computed by the parties. 
6.4.3 WS-Policy  
The WS-Policy defines the rules to express the capabilities and requirements of entities 
used in Web services environments by the use of policy assertions, in conjunction with the 
WS-Security SOAP extensions. 
6.4.4 WS-Federation  
WS-Federation extends WS-Trust to provide flexible federated identity architecture 
with clean separation between trust mechanisms, security token formats, and the protocol 
for obtaining tokens. It uses the browser based mechanism for the entities interaction. In 
conjunction with WS-Security, WS-Trust and WS-Policy, it provides the support for 
secure propagation of identity, attribute authentication and authorization information. It 
also enables the brokering of trust and security token exchange as well as support for 
privacy by hiding identity and attributes information. It provides federated sign-out, as 
well. The WS-Federation leave the privacy decisions to implementers what may lead to 
bad practices, increasing the risk of privacy violation. 
6.4.5 WS-Trust 
WS-Trust is the initiator of the circle of trust within the federation. It defines the type 
of security tokens they must use in the headers of WS-Security. WS-* does not provided 
support for authentication context (e.g. use of smart card). 
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6.5 Shibboleth 
The Shibboleth standard [63] is a specification by Internet2 that is now converged with 
the SAML specifications. Shibboleth standard follows the browser-based model for the 
messages exchanges between entities. This specifications address federation services 
within an institutional context rather than within a web applications one. It does not 
mandate the model of a common IP for the federation but the acceptation of the credentials 
of the others services providers‘ identity providers by the federated members (credentials 
recognizance). Further, it defines the standard-based protocol for securely transferring 
attributes between home site and resource site. These traits demands that Shibboleth adds 
optional WAYF (Where Are You From) service for identity provider selection besides the 
elements identity provider and service provider. Shibboleth provides single sign-on to 
federation and attributes exchange built on SAML Specifications. The specifications define 
Shibboleth-specific transient identifiers, but recommends that it should be used only once. 
Shibboleth specifies control over login methods, by defining authentication context 
indications. 
6.6 Microsoft Information Cards and the Microsoft identity 
metasystem vision 
The identity metasystem is a vision of interoperability between existing digital identity 
management specifications, with the idea that a universal identity system is unlikely to 
ever exist [64]. It is based upon a set of principles called the ―Laws of Identity‖ [21] 
described in subsection 2.10.  The identity metasystem is implemented by the Card Space 
technology, also called information cards, as they are the base of the identity metasystem. 
These cards have a list of claims from the user and a list of assertion types the identity 
provider supports. In order to achieve interoperability between system supporting a 
different federated identity specification, claim transformers are used for crossing 
organizational boundaries. 
In the identity metasystem the identity provisioning is achieved by the identity selector 
mechanism. Users are the ones that choose which identity (information cards) to provide 
from a set they have on their card space. The idea behind this is to rely on the users the 
assertions of digital identities to service providers as they already do in the offline world, 
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by choosing which card to provide in any given situation. Each card possesses a visual 
representation with a card-like picture and a name describing the underlying identity. Is not 
demanded that each card possesses any particular information of the user, it can have only 
information about the identity provider that manages the holder identity. The technology 
enables a given user to customize the information he/she wants to provider for the card. 
These cards have a great advantage of being strong phishing resistant, what protects the 
privacy of the user and the intervenient on the information cards exchange from ill-
intended attacks. Since an information card is given in any authentication method, 
password based authentication method is avoided. 
The identity metasystem is built by using the Web Services specifications (WS-*) [62] 
described before. The messages are secured using WS-Security, the encapsulating protocol 
used for claims transformation is WS-Trust and the format and claims negotiations 
between participants are conducted using WS-MetadataExchange and WS-SecurityPolicy 
(which is based on WS- Policy). The identity metasystem follows a client based message 
exchange mechanism between identity provider and service provider. 
The information cards can be of the following kinds: 
 Managed Cards – are given by the identity provider to the users, who 
previously imported it to the identity selector. 
 Personal Cards or self-issue cards – are associated to self-identity provisioning, 
they are stored in the user machine. 
The CardSpace implements a mechanism to support (strong) authentication context, it 
implements the personal pin identifier (PIN).  
The card space idea assumes that the users are always in the possession of their 
information cards, which may lead to a situation that a user cannot access some website 
due to not having his/her CardSpace at the moment. The following table shows the list of 
available claims in the information card technology. 
Table 3 - Identity Claims of the Identity metasystem. 
Claim URI 
Given Name http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/givenname 
Last Name http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/surname 
Street http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/streetaddress 
Locality (City) http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/locality 
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State or Province http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/stateorprovince 
Postal Code http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/postalcode 
Country/Region http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/country 
Phone Number http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/homephone 
Other Phone http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/otherphone 
Mobile Phone http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/mobilephone 
Date of Birth http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/dateofbirth 
Gender http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/gender 
PPID http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/privatepersonalidentifier 
6.7 SAML 2.0 
SAML [65] stands for Security Assertion Markup Language. It is an OASIS [66] 
specification that defines a XML-based framework for communicating security and 
identity information between computing identities. The last version of SAML, version 2.0, 
was a convergence of SAML 1.1, Shibboleth 1.3 and Liberty ID-FF 1.1 specifications. 
SAML workflow baseline is defined by assertion, protocols, bindings and profiles. Such is 
structured in three main parts: 
 SAML Core [67] (assertions and protocols) – defines the xml format for the 
messages exchanged between federated agents and specify the use of it. 
 SAML Bindings [68] – specify a set of bindings to ensure that independently 
implemented SAML-conforming software can interoperate when using 
standard messaging or communication protocols by defining the mapping of 
the SAML messages exchanged. 
 SAML Profiles [69] – outlines a set of rules describing the body of the 
messages for carrying the assertions, and how they are extracted from and 
embedded into a transporting protocol. 
SAML V2.0 standard define other specification to approach other federated identity 
requirements. 
 SAML Metadata [70] – defines the syntax for entities bootstrap the trust 
process when enabling federation for a user. 
SAML also defines guidelines for defining authentication context [71], and released a 
set of considerations regarding privacy and security [72], as well as a set of requirements 
for its implementation [73]. 
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6.8  Discussion 
The last chapter provided a description of the features of the most relevant federated 
identity model standards.  
The OpenID initiative is addressed to web applications that do not require strong 
security. It is more addressed to SSOn scenarios rather than identity data management. The 
Windows Live ID only provides specifications for the service provider side, does not 
define any authentication context. Both previous initiatives have the advantage of being 
wide diffused across the Web. 
The identity metasystem has the advantage of trying to create a platform of translation 
between the several existing standards than rather creating a new one.  Even though it is a 
good idea, it must implement mechanisms of translation addressed to each standard that it 
tries to integrate, becoming the specification too complex.  It also has the drawback of 
being necessary to install appropriated software in the users systems and by the 
implementation of the Windows CardSpace it assumes that the users always have it with 
them. Nevertheless, the concept of information card is excellent for structuring the users‘ 
personal information. 
The WS-* set of specifications is  a complex initiative. It leaves the implementation of 
important features such as pseudonyms to the developers, rather than imposing it. It may 
lead to a situation where two WS-* Federation system may not be able to federate due to 
different implementation. It does not implement any authentication context. 
Shibboleth is more addressed for corporations and institutional contexts and together 
with Liberty ID-FF converged on SAML 1.1, resulting on SAML 2.0 specifications. 
The SAML specifications define the protocol messages format and the bindings for the 
embedding and transport of protocol messages between systems. It also defines a set of 
profiles for structuring the information exchange according to the actors involved, 
providing a base line for the use of SAML assertions and protocols to accomplish specific 
use cases or achieve interoperability when using SAML features. SAML specifies how 
systems define the authentication context required for the establishment of identity 
federation and security lines to secure the information exchange, as well. 
SAML demands the use of pseudonyms for the representation of users, avoiding the 
possibility of services discern users by the correlation of their identity identifiers. The use 
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of pseudonyms for the representation of users protects the users‘ privacy and so on their 
anonymity. Upon the previous descriptions and analyzes and when comparing SAML with 
the other initiatives, it may be realized that SAML is the most complete and suitable 
standard to integrate in the GlobaliD Federated Digital Identity framework Actually, since 
every other standard either uses SAML on their specifications or converged into it, SAML 
is the de-facto initiative for implementing identity federation. 
Now that the standard to use in the development of GlobaliD Federated Digital 
Identity is chosen, its particularities will be explained in a more deep detail, in the 
following section. 
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7  SAML 2.0 
SAML defines a group of specifications that addresses a wide range of aspects for 
implementing identity federation. The specifications address the format of the messages 
exchanged between the service provider and identity provider on the assertions and 
protocols specifications. In another specification it addresses the bindings for exchanging 
the protocol messages. In the profiles specifications it describes the coordinated use of the 
protocols messages and the bindings for establishing message exchange between systems. 
SAML also addresses a specification for system configuration data exchange in the 
Metadata specifications. Other specifications are defined to approach other identity 
federation particularities such as the authentication context establishment. 
In a SAML session the following actors may be involved: 
 Requester – the entity who creates the authentication request and to whom the 
correspondent response is to be returned. 
 Presenter – the entities who presents the request. 
 Requested Subject – the entity about whom one or more assertions are being 
requested. 
 Relying Party – the entity or entities expected to consume the assertion to 
accomplish a purpose defined by the profile or context of use, generally to 
establish a security context. 
 Identity Provider – the entity to whom the presenter gives the request and from 
whom the presenter receives the response. 
 The principal – a reference to the user. 
Next it will me mentioned and described the particularities of SAML in nutshell based 
on the SAML specifications available on www.oasis-open.org [67-73] and according to the 
features used for the development of the GlobaliD identity provider. The specifications 
used on the GlobaliD identity provider will be described more in detail. The reading of the 
following subsections does not exempt the reader of this document from consulting the 
specifications provided on the website referred previously in order to comprehend the 
SAML initiative. 
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7.1 Assertions 
The core specifications are made by the assertions and protocols definitions [67]. They 
specify the syntax and semantics for the assertions messages about authentication, 
attributes, and authorization, and for the protocols that convey this information. SAML 
assertions and protocol messages are encoded in XML and use XML namespaces to refer 
to it. They are typically embedded in other structures for transport, such as HTTP POST 
(binding) request or XML-encoded SOAP messages. An assertion is a package of 
information that supplies zero or more statements made by a SAML authority about a 
subject. SAML authorities are sometimes referred to as assertion parties in discussions of 
assertion generator and exchange, and systems entities that use received assertions are 
known as relying parties. Usually, assertion parties and relying parties are called identity 
providers and services providers, respectively. The SAML specification defines three 
different kinds of assertion statements that can be created by a SAML authority, which are 
associated to a given subject. The three kinds of statement defined in this specification are: 
 Authentication – the assertion subject was authenticated by a particulars 
means at a particular time.  
 Attributes – the assertion subject was associated with the supplied attributes. 
 Authorization decision – a request to allow the assertion subject to access the 
specified resource has been granted, denied or indeterminate. 
The outer structure of an assertion is generic, providing information that is common to 
all of the statements within it. Within an assertion, a series of inner elements describe the 
authentication, attribute, authorization decision or user-defined statements containing the 
specifics. Some elements are of option use and others are either required or mandatory. 
The <Assertion> XML element specifies the basic information that is common to all 
assertions, including the following elements and attributes: 
 Version [Required] - specifies the SAML current version used for building the 
respective assertion.  
 ID [Required] – holds the unique identifier for the assertion. 
 Issue Instant [Required] – holds the time instant of the issue of the assertion in 
UTC. 
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 <Issuer> [Required] – defines the SAML authority that is making the claim(s) 
assertion and provides information about it. The issue should be ambiguous to 
the intended relying parties. 
 <ds:Signature> [Optional] – holds the XML signature that protects the integrity 
of and authenticates the issuer of the assertion.  
 <Subject> [Optional] – defines the subject statement in the assertion, i.e., the 
subject of all of the statements in the assertion. The subject of the assertion 
may be encrypted by using a <EncryptedID> element. 
 <Conditions> [Optional] – specifies the conditions that must be evaluated when 
assessing the validity of and/or when using the assertion. Defines constraints on 
the acceptable use of SAML assertions, such as the validity period of the 
assertions, the audience, and its retention for future use. 
 <Advice> [Optional] – contains any additional information that the SAML 
authority wishes to provide to the relying party. 
 <Statement> [Optional] – it is an extension point that allows other assertion-
based applications to reuse the SAML assertion framework. This holds any of 
the following statements: 
o <AuthnStatement> – this element describes that the assertion subject 
was authenticated by a particular means at a particular time. 
o <AuthzDecisionStatement> – describes a statement by the SAML 
authority asserting that a request for access by the assertion subject to 
the specified resource has resulted in the specified authorization 
decision on the basis of some optionally specified evidence. It states 
whether the subject of the assertion may access the determined resource 
for take a determined action, e.g., the permission to read some file. 
o <AttributeStatement> – describes a statement by the SAML authority 
asserting that the assertion subject is associated with the specified 
attributes. The specified attributes may be encrypted. In such a case the 
element <EncryptedAttribute> is used instead of the <Attribute> one. 
 Multiple statements may be provided to the assertion or none at all. When used at 
least one authentication statement in the assertion the <Subject> of the assertion must be 
provided as well. In order to allow the use of other kinds of assertions and statements not 
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defined by the specifications, SAML permits the extensions of the schemas in order to 
support it. 
Next there is an example of a SAML assertion message: 
<saml:Assertion Version="2.0" ID="4c0129fc-0e05-496b-a9a0-00977bc7a973"  
IssueInstant="2010-05-30T00:27:51Z" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"> 
  <saml:Issuer>www.globalid.com</saml:Issuer> 
  <saml:Subject> 
    <saml:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent"> 
45311d3b-d019-4de2-9d04-4f60a6077069 
</saml:NameID> 
    <saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"> 
<saml:SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="2010-05-30T00:57:51Z"               
Recipient=”www.sp.com/assertionconsumerservice.aspx”  
InResponseTo="7a08de47-5f80-42a6-895b-444ab55c642a" /> 
    </saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
  </saml:Subject> 
  <saml:Conditions NotOnOrAfter="2010-05-30T00:57:51Z" /> 
  <saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2010-05-30T00:27:51Z"> 
    <saml:AuthnContext> 
      <saml:AuthnContextClassRef>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:SmartcardPKI 
      </saml:AuthnContextClassRef> 
    </saml:AuthnContext> 
  </saml:AuthnStatement> 
  <saml:AttributeStatement> 
    <saml:Attribute Name="Mobile"  
                    NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"     
FriendlyName="Personal"> 
      <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"  
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-nstance">960000000 
</saml:AttributeValue> 
</saml:Attribute> 
 <saml:Attribute Name="Email" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic" 
FriendlyName="Work"> 
<saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"  
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">userwork@email.com</saml:AttributeValue> 
    </saml:Attribute> 
    <saml:EncryptedAttribute> 
      <EncryptedData Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
        <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc" /> 
        <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
          <EncryptedKey xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
            <EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5" /> 
            <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
              <X509Data> 
<X509Certificate>MIIBozCCAQygAwIBAgIES/p9yTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADAWMRQwEgYDVQQDEwt3d3cuaWRwLmNvbTAeFw
0xMDA1MjQxMzIzMjFaFw0yMDA1MjExMzIzMjFaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMTC3d3dy5pZHAu 
Y29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCcKZ6i7MFmK9R+TfEpgL6gmZba7oqL4K 
Bh0uS2RPYcnRjKeCfa0ZIn/7hKw78g8MymIXtp3EflXvgGCeyrjai8biTh1INnHev9lIN+gwnS 
Y1+nWwp7nPR4WxYTR6bFBdRlWff+h6EiAlRjcgbQ13iXTh1W9do+M78Jzlokw3ku+wIDAQABMA 
0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4GBACDC8UPfZNDWjiXMJIgvPYCWTl7D/KhRVFPQk9CdYGS78aOqUbhJ 
Vv7RSigWnmsurgfu6Gy5n+4VQBL0b8JteqnnoRQOEvK6mQsAcO8Ug+lQLr1GoQqpmBrccQjSzQ 
P8Mw5JDV84OgurKger9a6FDoAmbUXiX9R5HN4EaQ0hdwEP 
                </X509Certificate> 
              </X509Data> 
            </KeyInfo> 
            <CipherData> 
              <CipherValue> 
OiUzH56fTHT5vToJq6EWTeFztrx+TBXSKNPTrgsv0u/gyh3VbMkE8tNpze49P2kR5wKOJmhCaje2iJ9UX9Cealnf6ZCe8qY4kNS
hbUPOtQcAv9eHbLcG8tQH0ss7kmmTxbQMwJOu/5shfKfxMcfBSi+E+HMrWDjKoVgnJRkRL+c=</CipherValue> 
            </CipherData> 
          </EncryptedKey> 
        </KeyInfo> 
        <CipherData> 
          <CipherValue>            
d4HAtr18hCGnHRGbXkK8n7MptdTgTP75KCCT8DJ0wHuxlhsRYbxI6ieUQi4bbCTe3WFqala2SZqtadpdEhqbM83y6QGLllvLeph
v1Q+he8j8QYyn2dK41kHt54P1l18od1/OQq62V9FrvNhgh4lYQLBE4s98HvDP91o/mkOgmlKkcunAhHxZ6BLV3a67Xv3UM/TC7C
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TWrAr4kk2GWMM0FPlgbAd9yRAQh3W5SpZN2U/AFiPRCt73MrUFgBCfqXHrO6DUeaNZ+kUA+rkEj1Nta9Mak9QbacqoByi6dLvTg
xS4Q+ptLMu8O8zu3s4dXJe8GDM0iD1ZNl8pSEONZuREwxfQluMF2ldmkDU5ZyDwtA37seS8RDdmr+AHc3rKAYnxjfCQHYcmC6Dk
tFAbgk1lO0CoBpVr2s8Ae9rdDwZukDIfxxaUZQFQOcP6ENIJyleA1lP7OtNR3yEe1WNc2pFp6GjRide48zvpqHjnNv0t3Rv46F2
Q5RGlu4na5Ufyf//T</CipherValue> 
        </CipherData> 
      </EncryptedData> 
    </saml:EncryptedAttribute> 
  </saml:AttributeStatement> 
</saml:Assertion> 
 
In this SAML assertion it can be seen all the XML nodes defined before. The assertion 
has the ID: "4c0129fc-0e05-496b-a9a0-00977bc7a973"; issued at: "2010-05-
30T00:27:51Z". It may be seen the issuer of the assertion is: www.globalid.com. The 
SAML NameID holds the pseudonym asserted to the user with the value of: 45311d3b-
d019-4de2-9d04-4f60a6077069. The subject confirmation information and conditions are 
also indicated on the subject confirmation and conditions XML element. The user is 
authenticated at the IP by the use of a smart card with PKI capabilities. The assertion 
provides the user mobile and email in the attributes XML element. The assertion also 
provides an encrypted attribute. The public key certificate of the identity provider is 
supplied the keyinfo XML element of the assertion. In the end of the assertion it is 
provided the signature of the message. 
7.1.1 SAML Identifiers 
SAML defines a series of identifiers for specifying the format of the identifier asserted 
to the user (<Subject>). SAML demands that some of these identifiers must be 
pseudonyms in order to protect the identities privacy and anonymity.  
 Some of the defined SAML identifiers are: 
 Unspecified – leaves to individual implementation the interpretation of the 
content of the element. 
 Email Address – specify that the user identifier is an email address. 
 Entity Identifier – specify the issuer of a SAML message. 
 Persistent Identifier – indicates that the identifier is a persistent opaque 
identifier for a principal that is specific to an identity provider and a service 
provider. Persistent name identifiers generated by identity providers must be 
constructed using pseudo-random values. 
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 Transient Identifier – indicates that the content of the element is an identifier 
with transient semantics and should be treated as an opaque and temporary 
value by the relying party. Transient Identifiers should be constructed using 
pseudo-random values. 
SAML defines other types of identifiers on the assertion and protocols specification 
section 8. Refer to it for further insights on this matter. 
7.2   Protocols 
SAML Protocols messages can be generated and exchanged using a variety of 
protocols. The SAML bindings specifications [68] describes specific means of transporting 
protocol messages using existing widely deployed transport protocols. The protocols 
specifications define two base types of messages: Request messages and Response 
Messages. Figure 18 illustrates the process of the messages by the authorities and relying 
parties. 
Process Request ResponseRequest
 
Figure 18 - SAML Request-Response Protocol. 
In certain cases, when permitted by the SAML profile being used, a SAML response 
may be generated and sent without the responder having received a corresponding request. 
The protocols defined by SAML achieve the following actions: 
 Returning one or more requested assertions. This can occur in response to 
either a direct request for specific assertions or a query for assertions that meet 
particular criteria. 
 Performing authentication on request and returning the corresponding 
assertion. 
 Registering a name identifier or terminating a name registration on request. 
 Retrieving a protocol message that has been requested by means of an artifact. 
 Performing a near-simultaneous logout of a collection of related sessions 
(―single logout‖) on request. 
 Providing a name identifier mapping on request. 
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7.2.1 Requests and Responses 
SAML Requests are messages sent by the relying party to the asserting party. SAML 
Responses are messages sent by the asserting party to the relying party. 
All SAML messages have or may have the following elements and attributes: 
 Version [Required] - specifies the SAML current version used for building the 
respective assertion.  
 ID [Required] – holds the unique identifier for this assertion. 
 Issue Instant [Required] – the time instant of the issue of the assertion in UTC. 
 Destination [Required] – an URI reference indicating the address to which this 
request has been sent. This is useful to prevent malicious forwarding of 
requests to unintended recipients, a protection that is required by the protocols 
bindings. 
 Consent [Optional] – indicates whether or not (and under what conditions) 
consent has been obtained from a principal in the sending of this request. 
 <saml:Issuer> [Required] – defines the SAML authority that is making the 
claim(s) assertion and provides information about it. The issue should be 
ambiguous to the intended relying parties. 
 <ds:Signature> [Optional] – hold the XML signature that protects the integrity 
of and authenticates the issuer of the assertion.  
<Extensions> [Optional] – to allow custom scheme agreed on between the 
communicating parties. 
In the case of a SAML response the following elements or attributes may apply: 
 InResponseTo [Optional] – holds a reference to the identifier (ID) of the 
request to which the response corresponds, if any. 
 <Status> [Required] – specifies a code representing the status of the 
corresponding request in its inner element <StatusCode>. It may return a 
message to the operator in the inner element <StatusMessage> of <Status>. 
The <StatusCode> may provide a subordinated second level status code to 
provide more specific reasons  for the failure of the authentication, e.g., a status 
code of a response may have a second-level status code of NoAuthnContext, 
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meaning that the authentication context required by the requester was not 
obtained by the requester. 
Next there is an example of a SAML Response message: 
<samlp:Response ID="1ec77a4a-a89f-4679-abd9-2afa942c0d20" InResponseTo="f49b20ca-385a-4d3f-bc36-
dfed91e03d6b"  
                Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2010-05-30T01:06:23Z" 
Destination="www.sp.com/assertionconsumerservice.aspx"  
                xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"> 
  <saml:Issuer Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity" 
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"> 
    www.ip.com/ssoservice.aspx</saml:Issuer> 
  <samlp:Status> 
    <samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success" /> 
    <samlp:StatusMessage>User authenticated successfully</samlp:StatusMessage> 
  </samlp:Status> 
  <saml:Assertion Version="2.0" ID="999deccb-619a-426e-ba80-8042e5a4a4fb" IssueInstant="2010-05-
30T01:06:23Z"  
                 ... shortened not to spend too much space ... 
  </saml:Assertion></samlp:Response> 
 
In this SAML response it can be seen all the XML elements and nodes defined before. 
The same response specifies its Id on the ID attribute of <samlp:Response> element. Other 
information characteristic of a SAML response is also provided, such as the version and 
the Issue Instant. The InResponseTo attribute holds the authentication request id of 
authentication request message that originated this assertion. In the response it may be also 
seen the description of the issuer of the response and the status code of the response stating 
that the user was successfully authenticated at the identity provider. Then one assertion is 
provided to define the user for whom the response was created. 
7.2.2 Authentication Request Protocol 
The authentication request protocol defines the XML messages for requesting 
assertions containing authentication statements to establish a security context at one or 
more relying parties. In such case a <AuthnRequest> message element is sent to a SAML 
authority and it replies with a <Response> message containing one or more such 
assertions. In order to request that an identity provider issue an assertion with an 
authentication statement, a presenter sends it an <AuthnRequest> message that describes 
the properties that the resulting assertions needs to have to satisfy the purpose. The 
<AuthnRequest> message may have the following elements or attributes: 
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 <NameIDPolicy> [Optional] – specifies constrains on the name identifier to be 
used to represent the requested subject. This element defines whether the 
identity provider is allowed to create the subject identifier and respective type. 
 <saml:Conditions> [Optional] – specifies the SAML conditions the requester 
expects to limit the validity and/or use of the resulting assertion(s). 
 <RequestedAuthnContext> [Optional] – specifies the requirements, if any, that 
the requester places on the authentication context that applies to the responding 
provider authentication of the presenter. 
 ForceAuthn [Optional] – holds a Boolean value. If ―true‖, the requester 
requires that the identity provider authenticates the presenter directly rather 
than rely on a previous security context. 
 IsPassive [Optional] – holds a Boolean value. If ―true‖, the requester requires 
that the identity provider do not take visible control of the user interface, but 
rather interact with the presenter in a noticeable fashion. 
 AssertionConsumerServiceURL [Optional] – specifies by value the location to 
which the <Response> message must be returned to the requester. 
 ProtocolBinding [Optional] – defines a URI reference that identifies a SAML 
protocol binding to be used when returning the <response> message. 
 ProviderName [Optional] – specifies the human-readable name of the requester 
for use by the presenter‘s user agent or the identity provider. 
Next there is an example of a SAML request message: 
<samlp:AuthnRequest ID="b3a8066d-53e1-4cee-b668-de8f6446bd70" Version="2.0"  
IssueInstant="2010-05-30T01:33:21Z" Destination="www.globalid.com/ssoservice.aspx"  
Consent="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:consent:current-implicit" ForceAuthn="true"  
IsPassive="false" ProtocolBinding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST"  
AssertionConsumerServiceURL="www.sp.com/assertionconsumerservices.aspx"  
                    xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"> 
  <saml:Issuer xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">www.sp.com 
</saml:Issuer> 
  <Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
    <SignedInfo> 
      <CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" /> 
      <SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" /> 
      <Reference URI="#b3a8066d-53e1-4cee-b668-de8f6446bd70"> 
        <Transforms> 
<Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" /> 
          <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"> 
<InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="#default samlp saml ds xs xsi" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" /> 
          </Transform> 
        </Transforms> 
        <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" /> 
        <DigestValue>oe/Lgi2Wvc1uuhVH24eB2VVdca8=</DigestValue> 
      </Reference> 
    </SignedInfo> 
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<SignatureValue>e9E50T8abWyLwYPVi2WZu7xmHSUJc4jwuWkyvzpcvjhnKyX79b/9cbxDtHcA/QJ2fZrkm7yqv2/dHUBt+A8
RcXK0ud1QAGUqfvipdBVgsUEV451efsHSAyzD1LYfa67o/9Ow2a0RKYyPhIU7zdyR3s8NL9Db7GqUHzp6YnwlHhE= 
  </SignatureValue> 
    <KeyInfo> 
      <X509Data> 
        <X509Certificate> 
MIIBozCCAQygAwIBAgIES/p9yTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADAWMRQwEgYDVQQDEwt3d3cuaWRwLmNvbTAeFw0xMDA1MjQxMzIzMjF
aFw0yMDA1MjExMzIzMjFaMBYxFDASBgNVBAMTC3d3dy5pZHAuY29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCcKZ6i7M
FmK9R+TfEpgL6gmZba7oqL4KBh0uS2RPYcnRjKeCfa0ZIn/7hKw78g8MymIXtp3EflXvgGCeyrjai8biTh1INnHev9lIN+gwnSY
1+nWwp7nPR4WxYTR6bFBdRlWff+h6EiAlRjcgbQ13iXTh1W9do+M78Jzlokw3ku+wIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4GBACDC
8UPfZNDWjiXMJIgvPYCWTl7D/KhRVFPQk9CdYGS78aOqUbhJVv7RSigWnmsurgfu6Gy5n+4VQBL0b8JteqnnoRQOEvK6mQsAcO8
Ug+lQLr1GoQqpmBrccQjSzQP8Mw5JDV84OgurKger9a6FDoAmbUXiX9R5HN4EaQ0hdwEP 
        </X509Certificate> 
      </X509Data> 
    </KeyInfo> 
  </Signature> 
<samlp:NameIDPolicy Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent" 
AllowCreate="true" /> 
<samlp:RequestedAuthnContext> 
<saml:AuthnContextClassRef 
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:Smartcard
PKI</saml:AuthnContextClassRef> 
  </samlp:RequestedAuthnContext> 
</samlp:AuthnRequest> 
 
In this SAML response it can be seen all the XML elements and nodes defined before. 
The authentication request has the ID of ="b3a8066d-53e1-4cee-b668-de8f6446bd70" and 
was issued at the referred issue instant. The destination of the message is the single sign on 
service of the globalid.com identity provider. It is also defined that the SAML binding used 
for sending the authentication message was the HTTP POST binding. In the assertion 
consumer service attribute it is provided the address to which the response provided by the 
replier of the authentication request should be sent to.  The other elements specify the 
signature and the public key certificate of the service provider, the authentication request 
issuer. 
Yet, SAML defines other protocols for approaching the same authentication process. 
These are going to be briefly introduced. For further insights please refer to the SAML 
specifications.  
SAML defines the Artifact Protocol, a specialized protocol for providing a mechanism 
by which SAML protocol messages can be transported in a SAML binding by reference 
instead of by value. It also defines a protocol for changing the subject identifier after the 
identity provider had established one. The Name Identifier Mapping Protocol is defined for 
providing the identity provider a means by which it may obtain a name identifier for the 
same subject in particular format or federation namespace. The specifications provide a 
SAML-defined Identifiers collection for referring to common access actions, subject name 
identifier formats and attribute name formats, as well. 
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Finally, SAML defines a Single Logout protocol for providing a message exchange 
protocol by which all sessions provided by a particular session authority are near-
simultaneously terminated. 
7.3 Bindings 
In order to provide a specification for the exchanging of the protocol messages, SAML 
defines a series of bindings [68] for the purpose. On the bindings specifications it is 
defined how the SAML messages (request-response) are mapped into the transports 
protocol in order to implement interoperability between federated members. In this section 
it will be mentioned the bindings that SAML defines for the SAML agents establish 
message exchanging. The binding implemented on the GlobaliD identity provider will be 
described more in detail. For deep insights on the available SAML bindings please refer to 
the SAML Bindings specifications. 
SAML provides the following protocol bindings: 
 SOAP binding – a lightweight protocol intended for exchanging structured 
information in a decentralized, distributed environment. The two major design 
goals for SOAP are simplicity and extensibility. It defines how to use SOAP to 
send and receive SAML requests and responses, normally carried on the SOAP 
body of the XML message envelope defined by SOAP. 
 Reverse SOAP (PAOS) binding – is a mechanism by which an HTTP request 
can advertise the ability to act as a SOAP responder or a SOAP intermediary to 
a SAML requester. 
 HTTP Redirect binding – defines a mechanism by which SAML protocol 
messages can be transmitted within URL parameters. Permissible URL length 
is theoretically infinite, but unpredictably limited in practice. Therefore, 
specialized encodings are needed to carry XML messages on a URL, and larger 
or more complex message content can be sent using the HTTP POST or 
Artifact bindings. This binding may be composed with the HTTP POST 
binding and the HTTP Artifact binding to transmit request and response 
messages in a single protocol exchange using two different bindings. 
 HTTP Post binding – defines a mechanism to transport SAML protocol 
messages within the base64-encoded content of an HTML form control. This 
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binding may be used with either the HTTP Redirect binding or the HTTP 
Artifact binding. This binging was the chosen for implanting on the identity 
provider developed for this document. It will be explained more in detailed 
further in this section. 
 HTTP Artifact binding – is a specialized binding for the transmission of SAML 
messages by reference using a SAML stand-ion called an artifact. A separate, 
synchronous binding, such as the SAML SOAP binding, is used to exchange 
the artifact for the actual protocol message using the artifact resolution protocol 
defined in the SAML assertions and protocols specification. This artifact-based 
binding is the most secure binding that the specifications define. 
 URI binding – URIs are protocol-independent means of referring to a resource. 
Thus, this binding use the URIs to carry messages containing the assertion. 
Some considerations must be undertaken when using any of the available SAML 
bindings. Some bindings define a ―RelayState‖ mechanism for preserving and conveying 
state information, such as the resource the user tried to access before the authentication 
request took place. This relay state must be preserved during the subsequent message 
exchanging in order to enable the service provider to redirect the user to the resource the 
user tried to access in the first place. The protocol bindings should use of SSL 3.0 or TLS 
1.0, servers must authenticate to clients using X.509 v3 certificate. Authentication of both 
the SAML requester and the SAML responder associated with a message should be 
established according the context in use. 
7.3.1 HTTP POST Binding 
The HTTP Post binding defines a mechanism by which SAML protocol messages may 
be transmitted within the base64-encoded content of an HTML form control. This binding 
may be composed with the HTTP Redirect binding and the HTTP Artifact binding to 
transmit request and response messages in a single protocol exchanging using two different 
bindings. The HTTP Post binding is intended for cases in which the SAML requester and 
responder need to communicate using an HTTP user agent as an intermediary, such as a 
web browser. This may be necessary, for example, if the communicating parties do not 
share a direct path of communication. It may also be needed if the responder requires an 
interaction with the user agent in order to fulfill the request, such as when the user agent 
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must authenticate to it. Messages are encoded for use with this binding by encoding the 
XML into an HTML form control and are transmitted using the HTTP POST method. A 
SAML protocol message is form-encoded by applying the base-64 encoding rules to the 
XML representation of the message and placing the result in a hidden control within the 
HTML form. The form control may include a relay state data indicating, which service 
provider resource the user was trying to access to before the authentication request took 
place. Figure 19 illustrates the messages exchanging flow when using the HTTP Post 
binding for making either SAML Requests or SAML Response. 
 
Figure 19 - HTTP POST binding message exchanging flow. 
1. Initially, the user agent makes an arbitrary HTTP request to a system entity. In 
the course of processing the request, the system entity decides to initiate a 
SAML protocol exchange. 
2. The system entity acting as a SAML requester responds to an HTTP request 
from the user agent by returning a SAML request. The request is returned in an 
XHTML document containing the form and content of the SAML message. 
3. In general, the SAML responder may response to the SAML request by 
immediately returning a SAML response or it may return arbitrary content to 
facilitate subsequent interaction with the user agent necessary to fulfill the 
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request. Specific protocols and profiles may include mechanisms to indicate the 
requester‘s level of willingness to permit this kind of interaction (for example, 
the IsPassive attribute in <samlp:AuthnRequest>. 
4. Eventually the responder should return a SAML response to the user agent to 
be returned to the SAML requester. The SAML response is returned in the 
same fashion as described for the SAML request in step 2. 
5. Upon receiving the SAML response, the SAML requester returns an arbitrary 
HTTP response to the user agent. 
7.4 Profiles 
The profiles specifications [69] define the use of SAML assertions and request-
response messages in communications protocols and framework, as well as profiles that 
define SAML attribute value syntax and naming conventions. One type of SAML profile 
outlines a set of rules describing how to embed SAML assertions into and extract them 
from a framework or protocol. Such profile describes how SAML assertions are embedded 
in or combined with other objects ( for example, files of various types, or protocol data 
unites of communication protocols) by an originating party, communicated from the 
originating party to a receiving party, and subsequently processed at the destination. 
The intent of this specification is to specify a selected set of profiles of various kinds in 
sufficient detail to ensure that independently implemented products will interoperate. A set 
of profiles is defined to support single sign-on (SSO) of browsers and other client devices.  
The set of profiles defined by the SAML profiles specification are: 
 Enhanced Client or Proxy (ECP) Profile – an enhanced client or proxy (ECP) is 
a system entity that knows how to contact an appropriate identity provider 
possibly in a context-dependent fashion, and also supports the Reverse SOAP 
(PAOS) binding. This profile specifies interactions between enhanced clients or 
proxies and service providers and identity providers for enabling the 
authentication of users. 
 Identity Provider Discovery Profile – in deployments having more than one 
identity provider, service providers need a means to discover which identity 
provider(s) a user uses. This discovery profile defines a profile by which a 
service provider can discover which identity providers a user is using with the 
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web browser SSO profile. This profile relies on a cookie that is written in a 
domain that is common between identity providers and service providers in a 
deployment. The domain that the deployment predetermines is known as the 
common domain in this profile, and the cookie containing the list of identity 
providers is known as the common domain cookie. 
 Single Logout Profile – usually users authenticate at several websites while 
browsing the web. This profile defines a profile to enable users to single sign 
out of all sessions established with n multiple providers at nearly-simultaneous 
time. The profile allows the protocol to be combined with any of the defined 
SAML Bindings. 
 Name Identifier Management Profile – this profile is used to implement 
scenarios in which, either the identity provider or the service provider wishes to 
change the subject identifier value or to inform that it will no longer accept or 
send messages using a particular identifier. 
 Web Browser SSO Profile – relies on a scenario supported by the web browser, 
where a web user either accesses a resource at a service provider, or accesses 
an identity provider such that the service provider and desired resource are 
understood or implicit. The web user authenticates (or has already 
authenticated) to the identity provider, which then produces an authentication 
assertion (possibly with the input from the service provider) and the service 
provider consumes the assertion to establish a security context for the web user. 
This last profile specifies the steps for message exchanging, which may vary 
depending on the binding used in each step. Figure 20 illustrates the basic template for 
achieving SSO. 
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Figure 20 - Web Browser SSO Profile message exchanging scheme. 
1. HTTP Request to Service Provider – in step 1, the principal, via an HTTP User 
Agent, makes an HTTP request for a secured resource at the service provider 
without a security context. 
2. Service Provider Determines Identity Provider – in step 2, the service provider 
obtains the location of an endpoint at an identity provider for the authentication 
request protocol that supports its preferred binding. The means by which this is 
accomplished is implementation-dependent. The service provider MAY use the 
SAML identity provider discovery profile. 
3. <AuthnRequest> issued by Service Provider to Identity Provider – in step 3, 
the service provider issues an <AuthnRequest> message to be delivered by the 
user agent to the identity provider. The HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST, or HTTP 
Artifact binding can be used to transfer the message to the identity provider 
through the user agent. 
4. Identity Provider identifies Principal – in step 4, the principal is identified by 
the identity provider by some means outside the scope of this profile. This may 
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require a new act of authentication, or it may reuse an existing authenticated 
session. 
5. Identity Provider issues <Response> to Service Provider – in step 5, the 
identity provider issues a <Response> message to be delivered by the user 
agent to the service provider. Either the HTTP POST, or HTTP Artifact 
binding can be used to transfer the message to the service provider through the 
user agent. The message may indicate an error, or will include (at least) one 
authentication assertion. The HTTP Redirect binding must not be used, as the 
response will typically exceed the URL length permitted by most user agents. 
6. Service Provider grants or denies access to Principal – in step 6, having 
received the response from the identity provider, the service provider can 
respond to the principal's user agent with its own error, or can establish its own 
security context for the principal and return the requested resource. 
Note that an identity provider can initiate this profile at step 5 and issue a <Response> 
message to a service provider without the preceding steps. 
SAML also defines profiles for non-browser dependency. They describe the use of the 
protocol with the same name with a specific synchronous binding such as the SOAP 
binding. The profiles are: 
 Artifact Resolution Profile.  
 Assertion Query/Request Profile. 
 Name Identifier Mapping Profile. 
 SAML Attribute Profile. 
7.5 Authentication Context Specification 
The authentication context specification [71] defines syntax for the definition of 
authentication context declarations and an initial list of authentication context classes. Each 
class defines a proper subset of the full set of authentication contexts. Classes have been 
chosen as representative of the current practices and technologies for authentication 
technologies, and provide asserting and relying parties convenient shorthand when 
referring to authentication context issues. 
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For instance, an authentication authority may include with the complete authentication 
context declaration it provides to a relying party an assertion that the authentication context 
also belongs to an authentication context class. 
This intends to: 
 Make it easier for the authentication authority and relying party to come to an 
agreement on what are acceptable authentication contexts by giving them a 
framework for discussion. 
 Make it easier for relying parties to indicate their preferences when requesting 
a step-up authentication assertion from an authentication authority. 
 Simplify for relying parties the burden of processing authentication context 
declarations by giving them the option of being satisfied by the associated 
class. 
 Insulate relying parties from the impact of new authentication technologies. 
 Make it easier for authentication authorities to publish their authentication 
capabilities, for example, through WSDL. 
The authentication context declaration is defined by the use of an URI for reference it. 
The GlobaliD identity provider prototype will use the following two URIs for specifying 
which available authentication context the user is currently using: 
 URI: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport 
 URI: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:SmartcardPKI 
Other important URIs for the GlobaliD framework are: 
 URI: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:MobileOneFactorUnregistered 
 URI: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:MobileTwoFactorUnregistered 
 URI: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:MobileOneFactorContract 
 URI: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:MobileTwoFactorContract 
Other URIs are defined to specify a series of different authentication context that 
systems may implement. Please refer to the specifications for deep insights about it. 
7.6 Metadata specifications 
SAML profiles require agreements between system entities regarding several aspects 
for implementing identity federation, such as the definition of supported bindings, 
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endpoints, certificates and keys, and so forth. The metadata specifications [70] define how 
the different systems establish trust among them, by defining protocols for assert the 
necessary configurations in order to make the deployment of SAML systems entities 
easier. The metadata is organized around an extensible collection of roles representing 
common combinations of SAML protocols and profiles supported by the system entities. 
Such roles included that of SSO Identity Provider, SSO Service Provider, Affiliation, 
Attribute Authority, Attribute Requester and Policy Decision Point.  Each role is described 
by an element derived from the extensible base type of RoleDescriptor. Such descriptors 
are in turn collected in the <EntityDescriptor> container XML element, the primary unit of 
SAML metadata. In its metadata, the entities may alternatively represent an affiliation of 
other entities, such as an affiliation of service providers by the use of the 
<AffiliationDescriptor>. 
The aims of the metadata specifications are to provide a variety of security 
mechanisms for the establishment of trustworthiness between SAML entities, particularly 
with the ability to individually sign most of the metadata messages, for enabling entities to 
authenticate among themselves.  
SAML defines the <EndPointType> and <IndexedEndPointType> elements for 
entities define their available SAML protocol binding at which they can be sent SAML 
protocol messages. The <EndPointType> consists of the following attributes: 
 Binding [Required] – the URI defining the binding supported. 
 Location [Required] – the URI attribute that specifies the location of the 
endpoint. 
 ResponseLocation [Optional] – optionally specifies a different location to 
which response messages sent as part of the protocol or profile should be sent. 
The <IndexedEndPointType> extends the <EndPointType> with: 
 Index [Required] – a required attribute that assigns a unique identifier value to 
the end point so that it can be referenced in a protocol message. 
 IsDefault [Optional] – an optional additional Boolean attribute used to designed 
the endpoint by default. 
 The <EntityDescriptor> element specifies metadata for a single SAML entity. 
It consists of the following elements: 
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 entityID [Required] – specifies the unique identifier of the SAML entity whose 
metadata is described by the element‘s content. 
 ID [Optional] – a document-unique identifier for the element typically used as 
a reference point when signing. 
 ValidUntil [Optional] – optional attribute indicates the expiration time of the 
metadata contained in the element and any contained elements. 
 cacheDuration [Optional] – optional attribute indicates the maximum length of 
time a consumer should cache the metadata contained in the element and any 
contained elements. 
 <ds:Signature> [Optional] – an XML signature that authenticates the 
containing element and its contents. 
The metadata also provides the <IDPSSODescriptor> and <SPSSODescriptor> by 
which entities may specify some requirements and provide their endpoints. The 
<IPSSODescriptor> is used by identity providers to define requirements such as the 
requirement for the message received to be signed  or the SSOService endpoint to which 
the authentication request can be sent. The <SPSSODescriptor> is used by the service 
provider to define requirements such as whether it wants the identity providers to send 
them signed assertions or not and to specify the assertion consumer service endpoint. 
SAML metadata defines other elements for specifying the responsible organization and 
people for the SAML entity in the <Organization> and <ContactPerson> elements. 
Metadata should be publishing in a well-known URL location or in a zone of their 
corresponding DNS.  
SAML published the technical requirements and a set of documents that describes 
features that are mandatory and optional for implementations claiming conformance to 
SAML V2.0 on the SAML conformance specifications [73]. It also published a set of 
security and privacy considerations [72] for providing information to architects, 
implementers, and reviewers of SAML-based systems about the following: 
 The privacy issues to be considered and how SAML architecture addresses 
these issues. 
 The threats, and thus security risks, to which a SAML-based system is subject. 
 The security risks the SAML architecture addresses, and how it does so. 
 The security risks it does not address. 
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 Recommendations for countermeasures that mitigate those security risks. 
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8 GlobaliD Federated Identity Framework 
As it was said in the introduction of this Master‘s thesis, personal information sharing 
is a very often online activity. Users provide their particular information either when 
registering at some web application or to any other user. Most often they publish several 
kinds of data, such as text, photos, voice, and video. The exchange means users use to 
share their personal information lacks the mechanisms to provide full control over the 
disclosure and dissemination of the personal information they share, usually do not offer 
information scrutiny and displacement monitoring or any mechanisms to certify that the 
information representing them is accurate or asserted as true or false. Most of the times 
users are somehow forced to give up about some privacy or even their anonymity in order 
to accomplish a task, such as share a photo, an email, etc… Very often they multiply the 
provisioning of their information or the information of others across many platforms 
without any kind of concerns about it. Usually, the channels of communications used to 
exchange their information are not secure and several kinds of attacks are easily succeeded. 
Therefore most implemented identity management systems of today, are not offering the 
reliable and secure mechanisms necessary to relieve users about any concerns they might 
have when sharing their particular information with others. Moreover, most of the identity 
management systems do not follow any security guide lines, such as, implementation of 
encryption protocols in order to prevent unauthorized access to the data [48]. 
The proposed GlobaliD framework aims to provide a model for digital identity 
management in order to supply users with an easy, comfortable and most of all secure 
means for the management of their particular information as well as efficient means for the 
services providers managing the users‘ access to their systems and retrieve required data 
about them. The GlobaliD intends to be a resemblance of the OpeniD but instead of using 
an own protocol for establishing identity federation, it uses the SAML specifications and 
implements particular own features. 
In order to address this aim a GlobaliD federated identity provider prototype will be 
developed by using the proposed GlobaliD federated digital identity framework. With the 
development of the GlobaliD federated identity provider prototype it is intended to show 
that the use of the GlobaliD framework for federated identity management strengthens the 
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users‘ privacy, anonymity, accountability, trustworthiness, accuracy and veracity of the 
personal information they share within a web context as well as the security of the 
communications channels used for exchanging the information. It also improves the 
adherence and the access to different service providers as well as the managing of the 
users‘ personal data.  
The GlobaliD framework accomplishes this aim by: 
 Providing the secure and seamlessly access to the web applications. 
 Implementing strong authentication means for the secure access to the identity 
provider. 
 Offering of a relatively simple interface that allows users to selectively choose 
the pieces of personal information they want to provide to web applications and 
others. 
 Providing a mechanism which users can monitor their personal information 
scrutiny and displacement. 
 Providing web application adherence and information sharing log. 
 Providing a mechanism to assert about the accuracy of the information (true, 
false, managed). 
 Providing a ranking mechanism to classify the digital identity and or personae 
over the veracity of the information. 
 Securing the means of information exchanging, regarding the best practice 
guidelines to assure the integrity of the information, the privacy safety and 
anonymity of the users as well as to be protected against any kind of attacks 
that may be taken over the data in the channel. 
8.1 Framework Features 
8.1.1 Federation Establishment 
Based on what was presented on the section 6, SAML specifications are the best 
choice to achieve a federated environment. Hence, SAML is the federated initiative that 
the GlobaliD framework addresses for establishing identity federation.  
SAML provides several bindings to accomplish identity federation, creating multiple 
different ways for systems federate identity. Nonetheless, there are bindings more secure 
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than others. Hence, developers must implement all the available SAML bindings for 
establishing identity federation because thereby the required security for establishing 
federated identity is asserted by which binding the service providers choose for exchanging 
messages with the GlobaliD identity providers. Nevertheless, the GlobaliD identity 
providers should have the artifact resolution binding end point by default, because this 
binding is the most secure binding that SAML defines.  
The GlobaliD framework makes use of the SAML Web Browser SSO profile 
guidelines for establishing the communications between systems, where the user browser is 
used as an intermediary for the transference of SAML messages. 
The SAML identifier chosen must be either the persistent or transient SAML identifier 
according to the context for the effect. When service providers do not request any 
information from the users but just an authentication context assertion about the user, a 
SAML transient identifier should be used instead. 
A GlobaliD identity provider should supply the authentication context according to the 
last authentication method the user used when he/she authenticated at the GlobaliD 
federated identity provider, unless the service provider requires a specific one that was not 
used by the user on his/her last authentication at the GlobaliD IP. In such case the 
GlobaliD should re-authenticate the user according to the requested authentication context 
or issue an authentication failed response if necessary. 
Pseudonyms must be used for the representation of users at the services providers they 
federate with. Users‘ anonymity is thereby assured (see Figure 15).  
All SAML messages should be signed and encrypted by the issuer parties involved in 
the federation of the users‘ identity.  
The framework also demands the implementation of the Single Logout mechanism in 
the identity providers based on this framework. This mechanism allows users to near-
simultaneous log out from all the services they are using at a given time. 
8.1.2 Associations 
Each GlobaliD digital identity must be associated to several users self-intrinsic 
characteristics and to a few devices they use every day as a certification of the users‘ 
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digital identity.  The association between the users and their GlobaliD digital identity must 
be established by using (combination of two or more) of the following factors:  
 The Citizen Card – gives several information of the holder (user) to the digital 
identity. Part or all the information retained in the users‘ citizen cards should be 
extracted to the user GlobaliD federated digital identity profile according to the 
user specific allowance. Such procedure assures that the user holding the 
GlobaliD really exists. Moreover, the digital signing functionality should be 
used as a certification of the users‘ GlobaliD digital identities. 
 The finger print – gives a solid intrinsic unique identifier about the user. This is 
therefore another factor that should be used to assure the credibility of the user 
holding the GlobaliD digital identity. 
 The email – it makes a relation between the identity and one of the users‘ 
means of communications online. This mean of communication is important 
since it represents the users body online as it was told in subsection 2.3 
Representation of Digital Identity.. 
 The users‘ mobile – bounds the GlobaliD digital identities to a personal and 
real communication device.  
The different kinds of association are established by the extraction of users‘ particular 
information from any of these elements and by using their functionalities to apply on the 
users‘ digital identity such as the authentication feature they have. These associations are 
excellent in the way they assure the federated services that the users really exist, they 
provided real information to the digital identity and so users are accountable for the actions 
they take. Moreover they are a great protection against identity theft. 
Several multi-service providers as Google were several times convicted by a court of 
law to pay compensation for an offensive content to a person that was uploaded or made by 
someone by using the several services Google provides. By requesting GlobaliD identities 
associated to the users‘ citizen card, it would prevent this kind of lack of accountability a 
significant number of users tend to commit for they would be easily identified and 
consequently blamed. 
 GLOBALiD FEDERATED DIGITAL IDENTITY 
 
97 
 
8.1.3 Authentication 
 The GlobaliD framework demands the implementation of (one or more) the following 
users‘ publicly available authentication mechanisms in any GlobaliD Identity provider: 
password-based, email, citizen card, finger print, mobile [74]. The methods referred 
previously, with the exception of the password-based mechanism, can be used to 
implement strong authentication in a GlobaliD identity provider. The benefit of having so 
many authentication mechanisms is that when one is not available the other may replace it.  
For example, the users‘ finger prints may be used to authenticate users at the identity 
provider when their citizen card was either renewed or revoked by the state or even when 
they lost it. In such cases the association factor must be no longer valid and the holder must 
not be capable to use it to authenticate at the GlobaliD IP. Therefore, users should be 
provided a way to renew the association of the renewed authentication factor when this 
scenario arises. Users could use any of the other authentication means to access their 
digital identity in the meanwhile they do not have replaced the lost one. The same applies 
to the mobile, finger print and email factors when used. One important association factor 
besides the citizen card one is the users‘ mobile. It is relevant because such could be an 
authentication factor when users access websites through smart phones [74]. 
8.1.4 Profiling 
GlobaliD demands the provisioning of a relatively simple interface by which users can 
organize their personal data and selectively share it with web applications and others 
(identity federation establishment). The users‘ particular information is managed via 
profiling it in a digital identity.  
GlobaliD digital identity
Profile
User’s 
Personal 
Information
 
Figure 21 - Digital Identity Information. 
Figure 21 shows that each GlobaliD digital identity only has/is one profile, and the 
profile has the personal information of the holder of the digital identity. 
  
FRANK ALESSANDER PIMENTA 
98 
 
8.1.5 Information description 
The information users provide to the profile may be of several types, such as Name, 
Date of Birth, Age, Address, etc… Usually users tend to have several pieces of the same 
type, for example: Home address, Work address. Thus, GlobaliD demands the following 
framework for describe the type of each piece of information: 
Validity
ToFromValueIndexLabelType
Veracity
Real, True or 
False
 
Figure 22- Information description model. 
Type is the kind of the information: Address, Phone, Name, date of birth. Label is the 
usual customized description of the type of information e.g., Home Address, Work 
Address. Index is a numerical order reference for the information of the same type and 
Label: Home Address 1 and Home Address 2. Value is the actual information. Validity is 
the information‘s time of effect. Veracity tells whether the information is real, true or false. 
The real veracity is only controlled by the GlobaliD systems, it is used to assert the 
veracity of the information obtained from the users publicly available means of 
authentication. Figure 23 provides an example of information stored in a GlobaliD identity. 
Validity
ToFromValueIndexLabelType
12-12- 201012-12- 2009<address>1HomeAdress
12-12- 201101-04- 2009<address>2WorkAddress
--Adam1GivenName
Veracity
Real, True, False
True
True
True
--Tom2GivenName False
-01-01- 2000x@x.com1PersonalEmail True
-01-01- 19881234561BICivilID Real
 
Figure 23 - Information description example. 
Figure 23 shows part of user‘s profile.  It has several types of information which 
veracity value may be real, true or false. Label, Index and Value can be whatever users 
want. The user may use this information to create information cards.  
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GlobaliD makes available the following types for describing the personal information 
of users are: Address, CV, Date, Email, File, Finger Print, Gender, GPG, IM, Name, 
Nationality, Telephone, Photo, Profession, Status, Title, URL.  
8.1.6 Information cards 
The identity metasystem model described in the subsection 6.6 uses information cards 
to conduct the information users send to the web applications. For the metasystem, an 
information card is a representation of a digital identity, which is a group of pieces of 
information related to a given user. The information card concept (an analogy to the 
several cards we use in our real life) is a good idea for structuring the users‘ personal 
information. Therefore the GlobaliD framework demands the use of the information cards 
concept for the organization of the particular information users want to share with web 
applications and others. Thereby users will send their information to service providers or 
share it with others identities by gathering it in a group named information card. Users may 
name each information card they create. By doing so as a means to organize the users‘  
information, users will be capable to selectively choose only the pieces of information they 
want to send to the services providers when federating with them or to share it with others 
users. Moreover it is an easy way to organize the information to send to the services. 
Information cards are a resemblance of personae by the GlobaliD framework.  
Figure 24 shows the GlobaliD digital identity and the information cards hierarchy with 
examples of possible information cards that a GlobaliD may have. 
GlobaliD digital identity
Profile
User’s 
Personal 
Information
Information Cards
Fake Real
iTeach iShopiMetal iReal
Managed
VISA Bank
 
Figure 24 - GlobaliD digital identity and the information cards hierarchy. 
In the Figure 24 the user has several kinds of information cards. The cards are divided 
in three base categories Fake, Real (SelfCards) and Managed. 
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Figure 25 provides an illustration of the information cards structure of the GlobaliD‘s. 
SelfCards Managed Cards
Real Fake
 
Figure 25 - Information cards framework. 
In the figure it is illustrated the structure of the information cards by the GlobaliD. 
There are two types of information cards: 
 Self cards – cards created by the user. Self cards may be either Real or Fake. 
o Real – Real cards only have real information. The real information is 
inherited from the user‘s citizen card. 
o Fake – Fake cards may have real, true and false information. 
 Managed cards – cards asserted to the user by an outer entity in order to enable 
him/her to access or to use any of the services of the entity that asserted the 
managed card. 
The GlobaliD IP may create an iReal information card automatically from the users‘ 
citizen card information of the user. 
In the case of the GlobaliD being associated to the user's CC, because the information 
card they provided for federating with the web application is indirectly associated with it 
and with a pseudonym, users will be more reluctant at the moment of committing any 
action that may harm someone or fall in any kind of crime. In the case that such a thing 
would happen anyway, the user that committed the unacceptable action would be the one 
accountable for it and not the service provider. The use of pseudonyms for the 
representation of users in the services has the additional value of making users accountable 
and anonymous at the same time. This way the GlobaliD obtains accountability without 
giving up about either the users‘ privacy or anonymity. 
 GLOBALiD FEDERATED DIGITAL IDENTITY 
 
101 
 
Example 
Self Cards Managed Cards
Real Fake
John
12-12- 1980
John
PO Box 112
Aveiro
Portugal
12-12- 1980
IMetal
udt@x.com
iComment
Tom
10-2000
VISA XShop
 
Figure 26 - John information cards. 
Figure 26 shows a possible information cards scenario. In this case, the real user 
named John has two types of information cards, self cards, created by him (asserted by the 
Identity provider) or managed cards, asserted by the specific authority. 
The self cards type is made by two subsections, Real and Fake. The real subsection 
holds the information cards that only have information inherited from the John citizen card 
or any other means of associations referred previously. Therefore the real section holds 
information cards with only true claims, certified by an external authority. Real self 
information cards may be provided to an e-business, for example an amazon.com alike, 
when purchasing products in order to smoothly supply the service with the buyer‘s 
addressee. The fake section holds information cards that have either real, true or fake 
information. Information cards of this kind can be used to associate with web applications 
of social engagement as blogs, forums, and social networks in general. Users will be 
protecting their identity when doing so.  The Managed cards section holds information 
cards asserted by other entities such as the one shown in the figure, VISA, in order to 
enable the user to pay shops online. 
8.1.7 Information classification 
GlobaliD users are given the possibility to manually provide other information to their 
profiles beside the one extracted from the associations factors mentioned previously. The 
information given by them may be asserted by either as true or false. In order to tell apart 
which true information of the profile is provided by any of the users‘ association factors 
and which is manually supplied by the user, a numerical ranking mechanism is created to 
assert about it. The ranking mechanism has three levels from 0, 50, 100, where 0 means 
that the information is false, 50 means that the information is asserted as true by the user 
and 100 means that the information is true and consequently it was obtained by any of the 
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users‘ association factors. Thereby, the services will be able to discern which true 
information from the users was provided by their citizen cards and which one was provided 
manually by them. GlobaliD asserts the veracity ranking of an information card through 
the following formula: 
 
Figure 27- The information card veracity formula. 
In the formula the VR is the veracity ranking of the information card. The veracity 
ranking output range is from 0 to 100 percent. VReal and VTrue are the values of 100 and 
50 of veracity of the respective piece of information; ‗i‘ is the respective piece of 
information. 
The services providers may create their own kind of rankings over the information 
cards users assert to them. In the case of a news commenting website, services may 
provide users with a mechanism that allows them to evaluate each other‘s comments, such 
as the very used thumb up thumb down one. Thereby the website could provide a list users 
classification (points). 
8.1.8 Scrutiny and information displacement monitoring 
GlobaliD users will share information with others, visit websites and register in them. 
Therefore the framework demands that all user visits to the websites, and consequently 
registration (affiliations) should be logged. The same applies when users share their 
information to any entity via any mean of communication. Thereby GlobaliD users may 
monitor the scrutiny and displacement of their personal information and consequently, the 
web sites they visit and web applications they provided information cards to, by keeping 
these events logged.  Several kinds of lists for different purposes may be created. For 
example a list of affiliations will save information about which information cards were sent 
to web applications. The following figure illustrates it. 
 GLOBALiD FEDERATED DIGITAL IDENTITY 
 
103 
 
www.news.com
 www.poker.com
www.metal.com
eLearning
User’s list of affiliations
I.C. Entity
iPoker www.poker.com
iComment www.news.com
iMetal www.metal.com
 
Figure 28 - User's list of affiliations. 
This mechanism allows users to be always aware of the whereabouts of their personal 
information. When they consult the affiliation list they know to which website each 
information card was sent to. 
Another list could keep the users‘ visits to websites as show in the Figure 29. 
Users’ visits logs
I.C. Entity
iPoker www.poker.com
iComment www.news.com
iMetal www.metal.com
DateTime
02-04-2009 12:03
12-04-2009 01:34
30-06-2009 19:43
 
Figure 29 - Logs of the visits users made to the specified website. 
8.1.9 Information Privacy Regards 
Information cards are groups of pieces of information. They are used to send to the 
web applications in order to established identity federation with it. Service providers 
should only save it in their database after the approval of the owner of the information 
(the user).  When users do not allow services to keep their information, services should 
only save the pseudonym association for futures access to the service. In the case 
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service will need personal information from the user in the future they must request 
the users to allow them to retrieve it from their IP via an information card assertion. 
All the information cards sent to the service providers must be encrypted. 
8.1.10 Communication Channels 
In order to provide the best security when exchanging the information among the 
identity provider and the service provider, the GlobaliD demands the implementation of 
the HTTP protocol over TLS for establishing secure communications with others systems. 
By doing so, the channels used to exchange users‘ identity information are protected 
against eavesdroppers, man-in-the-middle attacks, and identity theft. Consequently, it is 
protecting the users‘ privacy and anonymity. Moreover, mutual authentication between the 
systems is implemented, users authenticate to the services providers, but the service 
providers also authenticate themselves to users (having the GlobaliD IP as proxy).  
8.1.11 User centric address book 
GlobaliD users have their personal information stored in a profile. It would be 
interesting if they could share it with other GlobaliD users, as well. The GlobaliD federated 
digital identity also enables information sharing between users that have a GlobaliD 
identity even if the GlobaliD digital identities do not belong to the same GlobaliD Identity 
Provider. The information is shared via information cards. This way the users build a user 
centric address book, always up to date.  
8.2 GlobaliD General Overview 
Figure 30 makes an overall overview of the GlobaliD Framework from the user‘s point 
of view. 
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Managed
AddressBook
Gave
Fake
GlobaliD digital identity
Profile
User’s 
Personal 
Information
User
Information Cards
Poker
iPoker
News
iComment
Real
iReal VISA
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@
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A
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Figure 30 - GlobaliD Framework Overview. 
The figure illustrates the GlobaliD Framework from a user point of view. The user has 
a GlobaliD digital identity. His GlobaliD Digital identity is a profile. The digital identity is 
associated to his citizen card (CC), finger print (FP), mobile (UM) and email (@). These 
associations provide particular information about the user to his GlobaliD digital identity 
profile. The user‘s particular information is used to create information cards to represent 
him differently in the web services. The user provides information cards to the web 
services in order to establish identity federation with them. The association between the 
user‘s information cards and the several services he is federated with is established by the 
pseudonyms. A per web application pseudonym is used as a representation of the 
information card at each the service provider. One Information card may be used in more 
than one service provider. The information card maybe exchanged with other users. 
8.3 GlobaliD Federated Identity Environment 
Figure 31 gives an overview of a GlobaliD Identity Provider in a GlobaliD identity 
federated environment. MiD and XiD are both GlobaliD Federated Digital Identity 
Providers. 
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SP3
Telecom company
Email SP
Profile
MiD database
MiD user
UM
CC
FP
SP2
SP1
@
MiD
XiD
A
B
D
E
RIC
FIC
MIC Information Cards
Address Book
A B C D E  
Figure 31 - GlobaliD Identity Provider framework. 
The figure represents a set of user profiles in the MiD and XiD identity providers (IPs). 
The profiles are MiD user, A, B, C, D and E. All profiles are GlobaliD digital identities. 
The trustworthiness and security of the MiD user identity is taken higher by associating it 
with some characteristics and technologies the users owns, such as his citizen card, digital 
signature, finger print, email and mobile. The different kinds of associations are made by 
the extraction of users‘ particular information from any of these elements or by using some 
of their functionalities to apply on the users‘ digital identity. The citizen card gives several 
information of the holder (user) to the digital identity. This information is certified by the 
user national state. The digital signing functionality enables users to certify their digital 
identities by signing it. The finger print gives a solid identifier about the user. The email 
makes a relation between the identity and one of the users‘ means of communications 
online. The users‘ mobiles bound their digital identities to a personal and real 
communication device. By making these kind of associations (@, CC, FP, UM) the MiD 
IP is assuring the federated services that the user really exist and is accountable for the 
action that he takes. Moreover strong authentication at the MiD IP is implemented by using 
the authentication capabilities of the user‘s association devices.  
Regarding the MiD user, part of the information of his profile was extracted from the 
devices he associated himself with, and kept marked as real information of the profile. The 
user can add more information to his profile and mark it either as false or true. The user 
can use his digital identity to federate himself with web applications (SP1, SP2, and SP3), 
using SAML assertions rendered by the MiD IP. The MiD user uses information cards to 
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selectively send his personal information to the web applications he wants to federate with. 
In this case his GlobaliD IP provides him a pseudonym in order to establish the association 
between him and the web application he wants to use.  According to the services demands, 
the user may use information cards of real (RIC) or fake information (FIC) to supply to the 
services he uses, and other cards (MIC) may be asserted by other authorities, such as banks 
and shops, to authorize the user to access their services, or to pay shops online, as a 
information card asserted by the user‘s bank would be nice to accomplish it if it would be 
possible.  The fake information cards (FIC) can be used in websites that do not request real 
information from the users, such as the websites of news, in order to protect his privacy 
when commenting any news. The pseudonym association established when the user uses 
any kind of information card to federate with the service provider forces him to behave, 
since he may be easy accountable for the actions taken within the public areas of the 
service. By using the classification of true, fake and managed information for the 
information of the users‘ information cards, MiD creates its own ranking of trust over the 
users‘ personal information, and consequently over the digital identity itself, according to 
the GlobaliD framework demands. Moreover, the use of information cards allows the 
websites to create a reputation ranking over it.  
The user may use information cards not only to selectively send information to web 
applications but also to selectively share it with other users or entities. Thereby, the user 
builds a user centric address book always up to date. Any GlobaliD IP represented 
implements the GlobaliD framework asserted security guidelines in order to protect the 
channels of communications against several kind of attacks. 
8.4  Major benefits 
The GlobaliD framework provides: 
 Smooth digital identity management – by providing users with an interface for 
managing their personal information according to each piece of information. 
 Seamless access to web applications – by providing single sign on capabilities 
to their digital identities. 
 Near-simultaneously log out of all the applications users were authenticated at 
– by providing a single log out mechanism.  
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 Secure channels of communications – by implementing the use of HTTP over 
TLS. This way the channels used for exchanging the users‘ personal 
information are encrypted, avoiding the unauthorized disclosure of any user‘s 
data. 
 A structure to organize the information sent to web applications – by grouping 
the users‘ personal information in information cards. 
 Scrutiny and displacement monitoring – by creating a list of affiliations with 
websites and personal information receivers. 
 Control over the disclosure and dissemination of each piece of the users‘ 
personal information – by delegating to users which information about them 
they desire to provide to the web applications. 
 Integrity and validity assured in information exchanging – by asserting that the 
SAML messages should be signed and encrypted by the parties involved in the 
federation of the users identity. 
 Information classification (real, true, false, and managed) – by providing a 
mechanism to assert about the veracity of the information they provide to their 
GlobaliD digital identity. 
 Strong and mutual authentication mechanisms – by using the association 
factors to implement strong authentication at the GlobaliD identity provider 
and by demanding the implementation of HTTP over TLS on the channels of 
communications, which permits that system authenticate to users as well. 
 Digital identity certification and classification – by the use of the users‘ 
publicly available authentication mechanisms and self-characteristics to 
associate to their GlobaliD digital identity and by the provisioning of an 
information card veracity ranking over the information it holds. 
 Protection of privacy and anonymity – by demanding the use of pseudonyms to 
represent the users in the identity federation association. 
 Simultaneous anonymity and accountability – by the associations of the users‘ 
publicly available means of authentication to their GlobaliDs. 
 User centric address book always up to date – by allowing that users share their 
personal information with other users that own a GlobaliD digital federated 
identity as well. 
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8.5 Major flaws 
 GlobaliD maintains all the drawbacks of being a federated model. 
 Users may fear the association of their digital identity with their citizen cards 
(or to any of the mentioned associations). This is high influenced by the user 
cultural context. 
 Personal information concentration may also be of concern (the big brother 
effect). 
 After users share their personal information to a service provider or to other 
users they cannot control its replication or provisioning to third parties. 
8.6 State of Art Comparison 
The GlobaliD Federated Digital Identity framework goals are the protection of the 
users‘ privacy, anonymity, the confirmation of its veracity as well as to make them reliable 
and accountable about the actions they take on the virtual world. The following table 
compares several initiatives discussed in this paper with the GlobaliD Federated Digital 
Identity features. 
Table 4 - Federated Initiatives Comparison. 
 OpeniD W.L. ID I.C 
Metasystem 
WS-* SAML GlobaliD 
Unique 
identifiers 
Yes No No Yes No No 
Pseudonymity Not demanded Yes Yes Not 
demanded 
Yes Yes 
Information 
categorization 
(R/F/Managed) 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Personae Not demanded No No Not 
demanded 
No Yes 
Via I.C. 
Information 
validation 
No No No No No Yes 
Strong 
Authentication 
Mechanisms 
Not demanded No Yes (P.I.N.) No Yes Yes 
Identity ranking No No No No No Yes 
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By the analysis of the Table 4 it may be asserted that the GlobaliD framework has 
features that strengthen the users, services and the whole federation, taking the federation 
identity management to a higher level. Instead of using unique identifiers for the 
representation of users‘ digital identities, the GlobaliD uses the SAML pseudonyms. It 
avoids the discerning of users by the correlation of identity identifiers and protects the 
privacy and anonymity of users as well. GlobaliD categorizes the information of users in 
terms of false, true and real data, demanding the use of information cards to represent it. 
This way, users can organize the information they send to the web applications they want 
to use and also monitor its whereabouts. The information classification permits the creating 
of several rankings (veracity, behavioral) over the users‘ information cards by the 
GlobaliD identity providers as well as the services providers may create their own rankings 
over the information cards users provide to them. By using the users‘ citizen cards or any 
other users‘ publicly available means of authentication, GlobaliD validates their 
information, their identity and implements strong and mutual authentication mechanisms at 
the identity providers, as well. In the absence of any of the users publicly available means 
of authentication they may use the traditional password-based authentication to access their 
GlobaliD digital identity, nevertheless. The association of the users‘ digital identities with 
their several self-intrinsic characteristics and devices they use every day makes users 
credible, reliable and accountable about the actions they take in the services they use, 
preventing their misbehavior in the first place. In any case they are always accountable for 
any action taken by them. 
8.7 Conclusion 
The GlobaliD framework smoothes and improves the users‘ digital identity 
management online by providing: 
 Seamless access to the web applications. 
 Control over the disclosure and dissemination of the personal information.  
 Scrutiny and displacement monitor over the information shared. 
 Classification of the information shared as real, true, false and managed. 
It also manages to strengthen the users‘ privacy and anonymity in their association 
with the service providers by: 
 Implementing pseudonymity for the representation of users.  
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Consequently, the use of pseudonyms for the representation of users makes them 
accountable at the services they use without giving up about the anonymity of the users.  
GlobaliD also demands the implementation of secure protocols that assure the 
protection of the channels of communication from several kinds of harmful attacks. By 
using publicly available strong authentication means it assures the veracity of the digital 
identity information, its authorized access and prevents identity theft in the first place. It 
makes users accountable about the actions they take on the web applications without 
giving up on their anonymity as well.  Users may have a user-centric address book always 
up to date. The SPs are set free from the identity management of their users, decreasing 
their maintenance costs and improving their services in the first place. 
Even though that the GlobaliD framework asserts security principles to the systems, 
the security of the digital identities are also a task that must be made by their holders, in 
order to avoid ill intend services, which may get their information for harmful purposes. 
Users also must assure whether the service provider is a reliable one by checking the 
browser identity information. 
As a general analysis, the GlobaliD framework fulfills the initial goal of taking a step 
further in the digital identity management world by making it more versatile, responsible, 
trustworthy, integrity and privacy safe, anonym and thus secure. 
  
FRANK ALESSANDER PIMENTA 
112 
 
 
 
 GLOBALiD FEDERATED DIGITAL IDENTITY 
 
113 
 
9  The GlobaliD Identity Provider 
In order to demonstrate a practical example of the GlobaliD, a GlobaliD federated 
identity provider prototype named GlobaliD was developed. This prototype, as the 
prototyping software engineering model dictates, provides limited functionalities of the 
GlobaliD framework. It also helps on finding more use cases to implement in a future 
solution for production. The aim for the development of this prototype is to prove that the 
management of the users‘ digital identities may be improved in comparison to other 
federated identity frameworks by using only part of the GlobaliD framework identity 
specifications, and thereby the digital identity management is fairly enhanced. 
9.1 Federation 
The GlobaliD IP follows the SAML specifications to establish federation between the 
users and the web applications as defined by the GlobaliD framework specifications. 
However only some features were implemented:  
 Only the SAML HTTP POST binding was implemented. 
 The single log out mechanism was not implemented.  
 Only the transient identifier is used to refer to the format of the users‘ 
identifiers. Thereby users will have to indicate which information card they 
want to share at each federation engagement (each website visit). 
 SAML pseudonyms are used for the representation of the users. 
 SAML Messages are signed and encrypted.  
 Only the association of the GlobaliD with the users' citizen card is integrated in 
the prototype. 
Figure 32 shows the page to which the user (testuser) is redirected when she wants to 
federated with a web application.  
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Figure 32 - Federation Page. 
On this page the user can select which information card she wants to share with the 
web application (service provider) she is about to federate with.  
Figure 33 shows the information card shared with the SERVICE PROVIDER web 
application. On the right top corner, right after the Welcome word it is displayed the 
pseudonym asserted to the information card provided by the testuser at the time of identity 
federation. Since the prototype is only asserting SAML transient identifiers the user test 
has a new pseudonym each time she accesses the web application, even if she already have 
accessed it previously, and no information card is stored by the SERVICE PROVIDER 
web application. If a SAML persistent identifier would be used instead, the web 
application would store the information card in their database, and its pseudonym would be 
used to refer the user in future visits (per-web application pseudonym). The user provides 
an information card each time she wants to access the web application by using her 
GlobaliD within the federated context of this prototype. The information cards sent to the 
web applications will be encrypted. 
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Figure 33 - User Information at SERVICE PROVIDER. 
In order to enable users to know which web applications they have federated with until 
their present time, the GlobaliD IP prototype provides a logging mechanism for the 
purpose. Figure 34 shows the testuser past identity federation. In each identity federation it 
is recorded which information card was provided to the federated web application, which 
web application the information card was provided to, which pseudonym was asserted to 
the information card and the date and time the identity federation took place. 
 
Figure 34 - User past identity federations. 
9.2 Information management  
An interface was developed for the management of the users‘ information according to 
the GlobaliD guidelines for personal information description.  Figure 35 shows a print 
screen of the application information management profile. In the figure it can be seen a few 
resources from an existing user named testuser. Each resource shown is formed according 
to the GlobaliD specifications.  
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Figure 35 - Sample of some testuser's resources. 
Each resource can be deleted by clicking the cross icon or edited by clicking on the 
pencil icon. If the resource is of veracity Real, it cannot be edited because this resource 
was extracted by some public available authentication mechanism of the user and therefore 
cannot be modified. Nevertheless it can be deleted because the user may wish not to have 
this kind of information stored in his profile. When the magnifying glass icon is clicked the 
user is redirected to a page where all the resource's details are listed and which information 
cards is that resource associated to. Figure 36 shows which information cards a testuser's 
resource of type Name and value CAPTAIN AMERICA is associated to. 
 
Figure 36 - Resource associated to the cards shown. 
The resource shown is associated to the testuser information cards iPoker and 
iComment. 
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User may add new resources to their profile and may assert its veracity as either true or 
false by using the form for it. Figure 37 shows the form addressed to add new resources to 
a profile. 
 
Figure 37 - Form for add new resource to the profile. 
Users can add new resources of any of the types indicated by the Resource Type drop 
down list. The form will adapt to the new type of resource users select e.g., if the user 
wants to upload a new picture the form will display an upload control instead of the 
textbox shown in the value row. 
User may also look for a particular resource or group of resources with specific 
features by using the search form illustrated by Figure 38 .  
 
Figure 38  - Search form. 
9.3 Information Cards 
It will be possible for users to create information cards from the resources they had 
provided to the profile. Managed information cards specified by the GlobaliD identity 
framework are not supported. Figure 39 shows the testuser Cardspace.  
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Figure 39 - testuser Cardspace. 
The user has four cards in her Cardspace. Each CardSpace has a picture, an alias, a 
veracity ranking indicated by VR and is integrated within a kind of category. In the case of 
the iNature information card it has a VR of 100% meaning that information card has only 
real resources and therefore its category is the Real one. The following picture shows the 
iComment resources and how resources are added and deleted from any card. 
 
Figure 40 - Add or delete resources to an information card. 
The respective headings indicate which resources the information card displayed has 
and which can be associated to it (all the resources user have on her profile). User can add 
and delete resources to and of the information card by just clicking on the plus or cross 
icons, respectively. 
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9.4 Information card ranking 
Each information card is provided its veracity ranking based on the veracity of each 
piece of information it holds as specified by the GlobaliD framework guidelines. Figure 39 
shows the veracity ranking of each card in the testuser's Cardspace. When a card has 100% 
of veracity ranking it means that all the resources contained in that information card were 
extracted from any of the public available means of authentication referred by the 
GlobaliD specifications. In the case of this GlobaliD prototype they could only be 
extracted from the testuser's citizen card. When a card has 0% of veracity it means it only 
has false information. Values between 0% and 100% indicate that it contains true and false 
information (user's resources), therefore it is a fake information card. 
9.5 Association 
Regarding the strong authentication factors defined by the GlobaliD framework, the 
GlobaliD prototype implements the use of the users‘ citizen cards to authenticate at the 
identity provider, but only the Portuguese Electronic Citizen Identity Cards are accepted. 
No other means of associations specified by the framework are used. Therefore the real 
information shown in the user's profile could only be extracted from her citizen card. 
Figure 41 shows the GlobaliD prototype's registration form when the user chooses to 
register at the GlobaliD by using her citizen card. The user's full name, civil id and her 
citizen card serial number were extracted from the authentication certificate contained in 
her citizen card. These pieces of information are stored in her profile database as a 
certification of her GlobaliD and for automatic login when she is accessing the GlobaliD 
digital identity with her citizen card. 
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Figure 41- Registration form when registering with the Portuguese Citizen Card. 
9.6 Authentication 
The users citizen card will be associated to the users GlobaliD Digital identity as a 
means for identity certification. It also will be used to automatically authenticate the users 
at the GlobaliD identity provider. No illustration his provided since the prototype redirects 
the user to her profile after a successful authentication took place. 
9.7  Environment of the GlobaliD IP 
Figure 42 illustrates the GlobaliD identity provider in a GlobaliD Federated Identity 
environment. 
SP2
Profile
GiD database
MiD user
CC
SP1
MiD
RIC
FIC
IC / Personae
 
Figure 42 - GlobaliD IP Federated Identity Environment. 
In the GlobaliD federated environment the user digital identity is only associated to her 
citizen card. The user can create only real and fake information cards. The managed cards 
specified by the GlobaliD framework are not possible to create. In order to federate with 
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service providers the users supplies them with information cards as defined by the 
GlobaliD framework.  
9.8  Database diagram 
 
Figure 43 - GlobaliD Identity Provider Database diagram. 
The diagram illustrated by Figure 43 provides an inner sight of the GlobaliD IP 
prototype database. The table globalid_Associations serves for keeping the necessary data 
of the users‘ publicly available means of authentication when they associate it with their 
digital identities for future automatic logins. The data collected is also needed for the 
certification of the users‘ digital identities. The globalid_AssociationTypes Table defines 
the type of the available users‘ associations (Citizen Card, Email, etc.) referred by the 
GlobaliD framework. The Table globalid_Resources holds the several types of information 
the users provide to their digital identities. The type of each resource is defined by the 
globalid_ResourceTypes table. Globalid_CardSpace represents the information cards users 
create and the globalid_CardInfo table holds the resources (users‘ personal information) of 
each information card. The table globalid_VisitsLog, is used to log users identity 
federation engagements. The aspnet_Membership table is the table used by the application 
to hold particular user account information. 
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9.9  Conclusion 
The GlobaliD identity provider offers a very good illustration of the implementation of 
a GlobaliD federated identity context by using only part of the set of specifications defined 
by the GlobaliD framework. By implementing only the association of the users‘ citizen 
cards with their digital identities, a fair amount of trust and accountability is obtained 
without giving up about the users' anonymity. The use of fake and real information cards 
grants the necessary certification about the users‘ when they federate with the services. The 
interface provided by the prototype application offers users an easy way to manage their 
particular information. A simple and versatile interface for creating and deleting 
information cards is also offered. The application also makes available a logging 
mechanism for users knowing which entities they have shared their information with, and 
consequently the federations to which they belong. Registration at the prototype by using 
the Portuguese citizen card is implemented and therefore it is possible using it to login at 
the IP, which prevents identity theft. 
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10 Conclusions and Future Work 
This Master‘s thesis was addressed to the digital identity management discipline. Its 
goal was to take a step further in the digital identity management field by making it more 
versatile, responsible, trustworthy, integral and privacy safe, anonym and thus more secure.  
In order to accomplish the goal, a profound study of the fundaments of the identity and 
digital identity management subjects was made. Their features and particularities were 
introduced, described and analyzed. By analyzing two models of digital identity 
management one had a clear comprehension of the procedures involved in managing the 
users‘ personal information and their access to the service providers. Thereby it was 
concluded that the federated identity model is the most suitable model for digital identity 
management and users' access to the service providers since it efficiently delineates the 
respective concerns of each entity involved in the identity and access management process 
and grants high versatility, reliability and security to the users and the involved federated 
members. By using a federated identity users are capable of monitoring the provisioning 
and scrutiny of their information and logging all their activities online while having 
seamless access to web applications. The scattering of their information across the web is 
controlled and their anonymity and privacy remains unaffected as well. The main 
inconvenience of the federated identity management that is worth mentioning is that once 
an attacker gains admission to a federated digital identity, he/she/it is capable of accessing  
all the services the identity is federated with and gathering all the identity information. 
Nevertheless, such inconvenience can be easily avoided by implementing strong 
authentication mechanisms and encrypted channels of communications. Yet users are the 
first agents regarding the protection of their privacy and discernment. According to which 
was just pointed out, when projecting digital identity management systems they should be 
based on federated identity initiatives since it entails major advantages and not so 
significant hassles in comparison to non-federated identity solutions. 
A federated identity framework named GlobaliD was presented based on the study 
made of the digital identity management discipline. The several parts of the framework 
were introduced, described, explained and analyzed. Based on the analysis of the GlobaliD 
and on its comparison to other federated identity initiatives available online, it may be 
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concluded that the GlobaliD entails significant advantages considering the users' 
information management, privacy and security concerns, making it a relevant and valuable 
framework for digital identity management. The factors of association (publicly available 
means of authentication) defined to bind the users to their digital identities are strongly  
beneficial since they provide an excellent level of trustworthiness and security to their 
identities and make them consecutively more responsible as well as more accountable for 
the actions taken on the services they federate with. Nevertheless, this may make them 
reluctant to adopting a GlobaliD. Furthermore, the fact that the GlobaliD framework 
gathers relevant and accurate information (big brother effect) about the users and their 
activities may lead them not to adhere to the GlobaliD due to privacy and accountability 
concerns or lack of confidence in the GlobaliD identity provider.   
In order to demonstrate the GlobaliD framework functionality, the Global Identity 
Provider prototype was developed. The development of this identity provider prototype 
proved that it is possible to supply the users and the federated services with highly 
trustworthy and reliable digital identities while keeping the users‘ privacy and anonymity 
safe and still guaranteeing the seamless access to the web applications by using only 
specific parts of the GlobaliD architecture. 
Even though the GlobaliD federated identity framework achieves a high level of trust 
and security and provides an enhanced solution for digital identity management, future 
work for improvements and adjustments of the framework will always be necessary 
according to the future requirements of digital identity management.  Future work may 
delineate an association of GlobaliD to the users‘ VISA enabling them a smooth online 
purchase (managed card assertion). Thereby, users would be capable of recharging their 
GlobaliD with a particular amount of money to directly pay products online by using their 
GlobaliD. Future requirements may be simply integrated since the framework is flexible 
and easily scalable. In fact, the GlobaliD framework may be used together with other 
federated initiatives with no problems. An integration of the GlobaliD with the metasystem 
information cards is possible through a simple adaptation, such as using the SAML SOAP 
Binding messages body to carry the information cards. 
 It can be said that the GlobaliD federated identity framework is a very straightforward 
solution for digital identity management because it is versatile and secure, whilst assures 
users‘ responsibility, trustworthiness and the safety of their privacy and anonymity as well 
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as the integrity of their data when exchanging it with other entities online. Therefore, the 
aim of bringing up an enhanced solution for digital identity management which could 
overcome the drawbacks of the existing models and initiatives for managing the users‘ 
identity and their access to the services providers in a reliable, trustful and subtle manner 
was achieved by the GlobaliD. 
Finally, with the creation of the GlobaliD the goal of taking a step further in the digital 
identity management field by making it more versatile, responsible, trustworthy, integral 
and privacy safe, anonym and thus more secure was accomplished. 
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